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Given the long, successful history of arbitration as an alternative
to litigation,1 it was no great surprise when the concept was pressed
into service in the medical malpractice context. The Commission on
Medical Malpractice, under the general direction of the United States
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, first suggested the
feasiblity of this latest utilization of arbitration in 1973.2 According to
the Commission, however,
[i]t became increasingly clear ... that there was a paucity of basic
knowledge, not only on the process of arbitration, but also on the
results. It was obvious that many persons and organizations who
had not analyzed the true characteristics of arbitration nevertheless
believed that it was a method of dispute settlement that would
make a major contribution to solving the malpractice crisis.'
* Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. B.A. (Law) 1975, Kingston
Polytechnic; LL.M. 1976, University of Cambridge.
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1. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 2-3
(4th ed. 1985); G. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 3.01-4.03 (rev.
perm. ed. 1985); Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 854-
56 (1961).
2. See DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, THE REPORT OF THE SEC-
RETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DHEW Pub. No. (0S) 73-88
(1973) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. California health care provider practice pre-
ceded such public comment. See Heintz, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims:
Is It Cost Effective?, 36 MD. L. REV. 533, 535-40 (1977); Henderson, Contractual
Problems in the Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 58 VA.
L. REV. 947, 958-59 (1972).
3. REPORT. supra note 2, at 91-92 (emphasis added).
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Indeed, the goals of those proposing medical malpractice arbitra-
tion must be examined closely. Lip-service may have been paid to the
two traditionally claimed advantages of arbitration over litiga-
tion-speed and economy.4 The push for the arbitration of malpractice
claims, however, must not be seen as linked to the general interest in
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms exhibited over the past two
decades. This examination of alternative mechanisms has had as its pri-
mary goal the identification of fora and procedures suitable for the res-
olution of meritorious claims that, for essentially economic reasons,5
had been excluded from the litigation system. In direct contrast, mal-
practice claims have always been guaranteed judicial resolution be-
cause of the contingency fee system.' Furthermore, unlike commercial
and labor areas, there is no evidence that the patient-provider relation-
ship has evolved to a stage that would make self-governance, and hence
arbitration, appropriate.7
There are two primary goals set forth by those propounding the
arbitration of malpractice claims: 8 first, to chill attorney interest in
what are labelled vel non as frivolous or unmeritorious claims; and sec-
ond, to reduce the size of damage awards in meritorious claims. 9
4. See, e.g., Sakayan, Arbitration and Screening Panels: Recent Experience and
Trends, 17 FORUM 682, 684-85 (1982). A third potential advantage that arbitration
may hold over litigation is the potential subject-matter expertise of the arbitrator.
5. For example, the size of the claim or the financial means of the claimant. See,
e.g., 1 AccEss TO JUSTICE, Pt. 1, chs. II, 1II (M. Cappelletti & B. Garth eds. 1978).
6. This may be a slight overstatement. First, a plaintiff will have to expend cer-
tain psychic and information costs en route to utilization of the contingency fee system.
Second, the plaintiff's attorneys (the source of the up-front expenditure) will tend to
filter out "unmeritorious" claims, or in other words, small claims with high litigation
costs but without any long-term pro-plaintiff precedential value.
7. See Mentschikoff, supra note 1, at 848-52. See also text accompanying notes
114-18 and 155-62.
8. See e.g., Baird, Munsterman & Stevens, Alternatives to Litigation, I. Techni-
cal Analysis, in REPORT, supra note 2, 214, 297 app.
To the extent that arbitration achieves public acceptance and provides
the advantages which are attributed to it of a speedy and inexpensive claims
resolution medium, its use must be encouraged. However, it is apparent
from the literature that the major motivation behind establishing arbitration
plans is to benefit hospitals, physicians, and, principally, the insurance in-
dustry, by privacy of proceedings and protection from large sympathy ver-
dicts of juries for which safeguards already exist in the judicial process. It is
also clear that its stated advantages of speed and economy apply only to the
hearing phase. Arbitration neither reduces the overall time required for
claim resolution nor economizes greatly the preparation phase of the medi-
cal malpractice claim.
Id. Cf. Coulson, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 3 OHIO N.U.U REV. 507
(1975) (a hearty endorsement of the medical malpractice arbitration concept by a past
president of the American Arbitration Association).
9. Cf. Schnepple, Arbitration: solution to malpractice dilemma?, 48 HOSPITAL
41, 43 (1974) ("[L]arge sums may still be awarded based on the merits of the case.
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Neither goal is related to providing a resolution for otherwise unresolv-
able claims. Both are intimately linked, however, to the widely held
belief that the judiciary is unwilling or unable to exercise effective con-
trol over juries in civil trials. 10 It is further suggested that any claim-
ant-group enthusiasm for arbitration involves a hope that arbitration
will substitute for further statutory diminution of plaintiffs' procedural
and substantive rights.
In the absence of any convincing empirical studies by which to
judge malpractice arbitration," the purpose of this Article is to analyze
Arbitration is not necessarily a means of decreasing the size of judgments.") See
Bedikian, Medical Malpractice Act: Michigan's Experience with Arbitration, 10 AM. J.
L. & MED. 287, 291-92 (1984).
10. See, e.g., Holden v. Rannick, 682 S.W.2d 903 (Tenn. 1984) When a trial
judge approves the jury's verdict without comment, an appellate court must presume
that he adequately performed his function as a "thirteenth juror." Id. See also Fowler
v. Mantooth, 683 S.W.2d 250 (Ky. 1984) The functions of the trial and appellate
courts differ when a question of excessive damages is at issue. The decisions of trial
courts, based on jury verdicts, are presumed correct by appellate courts. Id. Contrast
the position in England: Ward v. James, [1965] 1 All E.R. 563 (C.A.) (court of appeal
removed most personal injury cases from jury determination).
1I. For the limited data that do exist on the working of malpractice arbitration,
see Bedikian, supra note 9, at 303-05; Heintz, supra note 2, at 535-51; Ladimer &
Bush, Is arbitration the answer to malpractice disputes?, MED. WORLD NEws, Jan.
26, 1976, at 38; Ladimer, Solomon & Mulvihill, Experience in Medical Malpractice
Arbitration, 2 J. LEGAL MED. 433, 443-64 (1981); Note, Medical Malpractice Arbitra-
tion: A Patient's Perspective, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 123, 153-55 (1983).
Some states that have enacted malpractice arbitration statutes have subjected
them to empirical analysis. In 1975, the Michigan legislature passed the Michigan
Malpractice Arbitration Act, which among other things provided for the formation of
an Arbitration Advisory Committee. The Committee's Evaluation Subcommittee per-
formed a study of the program in 1982-1983, concluding that arbitration of disputes
involving medical malpractice does provide a cheaper and quicker forum for resolution
than does the traditional jury system. Specifically, the subcommittee disclosed the
following:
In all 2,611 closed claims opened after January 1, 1976, and closed between
June 1, 1978 and June 1, 1982 were analyzed. Of these, 1,159 were disposed
of prior to formal filing either in the courts or with the American Arbitra-
tion Association. Sixty-three of the cases filed in court were resolved by for-
mal trial. (This accounts for five percent of all claims filed in the courts and
two percent of all claims closed in which there was no signed arbitration
agreement.) The 36 formal arbitration hearings which took place during the
study interval constitute 36 percent of all claims filed with arbitration and
six percent of all closed claims involving a signed arbitration agreement.
Plaintiffs [sic] were successful in 27 percent of court trials and 31 percent of
arbitration hearings.
Using information claims data, and employing timeliness, cost and con-
sistency of award as standards by which to measure the comparative per-
formances of arbitration and litigation, the committee members found arbi-
tration to be characterized by a shorter time from filing to disposition, lower
expenses for defense of claims and more consistent awards.
Memorandum from Rhonda M. Powsner, M.D., J.D., to Saul Boyarsky, M.D., J.D.
1986)
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critically from a conceptual perspective the arbitration systems that op-
erate currently and to explore the technical legal problems they pose.
Further, wider questions will be raised: first, whether this new ap-
proach to dealing with malpractice claims runs counter to the underly-
ing philosophy of established arbitration and the accepted practical
limitations to the function of the arbitrator; and second, whether the
malpractice-specific arbitration systems that have been introduced truly
comply with the core tenet of this alternate method of dispute resolu-
tion-its consensual, voluntary nature.
This Article is not a thinly veiled attempt to resurrect Judge Hays'
infamous attack on established arbitration.1" Neither should it be taken
as a naive, pandering defense of the present, often excessive, system of
malpractice litigation. s Instead, it is suggested that for conceptual and
(May 10, 1985) (Dr. Powsner, a member of the Michigan Bar, discusses the Michigan
medical arbitration program) (on file with the St. Louis University Law Journal).
Results of a different type were reached by the Ross-Loos Medical Group. In a
study of closed cases in 1970-71, the Group concluded:
First, for the physicians ... arbitration is an unqualified success ....
Second, for the defense the arbitration proceeding is economical ....
Third, both explicitly and by implication, the attorneys who were inter-
viewed for this study seemed to agree on this point: The properly selected
neutral arbitrator will be objective ....
Fourth, the existence of arbitration ... has not promoted a plethora of
suits ....
An additional conclusion might be made from this study: There is
something to discourage the plaintiff's attorney in his pursuit of a claim....
The reason for this phenomenon is somewhat obscure, but ... it may well
have something to do with the attorney's comparatively greater skill at rhe-
torical device, as compared to his analytical ability when dealing with medi-
cal facts, Given a "handle" on a couple of jury-appealing facts in a malprac-
tice case, his skill at advocacy may carry the day. But before an arbitrator,
one assumes that the attorney must mainly win on the facts alone.
Rubsamen, The Experience of Binding Arbitration in the Ross-Loos Medical Group,
in REPORT, supra note 2, at 424, 443-44 app. These conclusions were based upon an
examination of only thirty-five cases, twenty-one involving attorneys. Id. at 428-42.
12. Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019 (1965). In that
article Judge Hays stated:
I am forced to the conclusion, based upon observation during twenty-
three years of very active practice in the area of arbitration and as an arbi-
trator, and from suggestions in the more intelligent literature in this field,
that ... arbitration has fatal shortcomings as a system for the judicial ad-
ministration of contract violations.
Id. at 1034.
For a more recent critique of labor arbitration, see Goldberg, The Mediation of
Grievances Under a Collective Bargaining Contract: An Alternative to Arbitration, 77
Nw. U.L. REV. 270, 274-80 (1982).
13. See, e.g., Burger, The State of Justice, A.B.A. J. April 1984, at 62 (criticiz-
ing the excesses and abuses that form the basis for much of today's lament about the
legal profession).
I am as confused, skeptical, and unsure about the role of the traditional trial in
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technical reasons, malpractice arbitration as currently envisaged is a
dangerously inappropriate solution to the real or perceived malpractice
crisis. As one commentator has put it, "for the negligently injured pa-
tient, blanket arbitration piles poor legal care on top of poor medical
care."14
II. A TALE OF Two CRISES
A. The Malpractice Crises and Curative Legislation
Medical malpractice arbitration is an American phenomenon5
stemming from the so-called malpractice crises of the past decade.
Thus, its role and its juridical foundations can only be appreciated
within the context of these crises. In 1973, the Secretary's Commission
on Medical Malpractice was forced to conclude that "there is no
uniquely identifiable 'malpractice problem,' but rather, a complex of
problems involving interacting medical, legal, sociological, psychologi-
cal, and economic factors."16 For many, however, this official imprima-
tur of "problem" was enough in itself; the complex, polycentric nature
of the problem was ignored, empirical research eschewed. State legisla-
tures in the 1970's simply declared that there was a malpractice "cri-
sis," that the cause was medical malpractice law, and that the solution
was "crisis" legislation designed to curb, delay, or otherwise frustrate
the prosecution of malpractice claims.
Just as the passage of crisis legislation did not quash the debate
over the reality of any crisis, neither did such legislation stem the tide
of rising health care costs. Despite some evidence of a dramatic decline
in the number of medical malpractice claims after the peak of the crisis
in 1975,17 there were no signs of any drop in the acceleration rate of
malpractice premiums.18 Furthermore, as the 1980's progressed, even
the number of malpractice claims seemed, once again, to be on the
our legal system as anyone (probably more so). See, e.g., Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J.
989, 995-98 (1978). Further, while I admit (for want of clearer articulation or more
sophisticated analysis) to a "plaintiff bias," I consider the holy grail of jury determina-
tion of civil cases to be, at best, of doubtful utility and, at worst, downright silly. I have
chosen to mask my own uncertainties by incanting that old common-law standby, the
burden of proof. Those who wish to replace the status quo with a new system must
prove its advantages, be clear about their motives, and with specific regard to the adop-
tion of an extant format such as voluntary arbitration, satisfy conceptual doubts about
its literal transferability to the malpractice context.
14. Ladimer & Bush, supra note 11, at 52 (comment by Bush).
15. Compare and contrast the various "small claims" arbitration systems de-
tailed in the "world survey" in I ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 6.
16. REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
17. N.Y. Times, April 19, 1983, at 8, col. I (reporting on a study by the Rand
Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice).
18. In New York, for example, the State Superintendent of Insurance permitted
a 52% increase in malpractice insurance premiums. Id., Jan. 15, 1985, at Al, col. 2.
19861
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
increase." This increase, coupled with evidence that the size of mal-
practice awards and settlements was also on the increase, 20 heralded
the appearance of a second malpractice "crisis. 12 1 As was the case in
the first crisis in the 1970's, assertions that a second crisis is underway
have not gone unchallenged. Commentators have critically scrutinized
reports which advance the thesis that the average jury award far ex-
ceeds injuries actually suffered.22 Other authorities have concluded that
the increase in malpractice claims is a function of the growing incom-
petence within the medical profession itself.23 Further, while the link
between the rising costs of malpractice insurance and increased health
care costs seems well established, 4 some have asserted that this repre-
sents only a "trifling percentage" of the rising overall costs of health
care in the United States.2 Various skeptics have even suggested that
19. According to a report by the American Medical Association, the claim rate
at the height of the malpractice crisis in 1975 was fewer than 5 per 100 doctors. By
1983, however, the rate had climbed to 16 claims per 100 doctors. Id., Jan. 17, 1985, at
1, col. 6.
20, Id.
21. "The public fighting [between the American Medical Association and the
Association of American Trial Lawyers] started a year ago, when the AMA pro-
claimed that a new medical malpractice 'crisis' had begun." Tempers Flare Over Mal-
practice, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 18, 1986, at Cl, col. 1. Cf Should lawyers'
contingencyfees be limited?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 27, 1986, at 43 (inter-
view with Peter Perlman, President of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America).
Mr. Perlman stated:
The so-called insurance crisis can be traced primarily to the drop in interest
rates, which limits the investment income of insurance firms. There was no
claim of a crisis in the late 1970s, when interest rates were high. Insurers
were reducing their premiums to get a bigger market share. Rather than
basing premiums on expected losses, they based them on expected invest-
ment return, and now that comes back to haunt them.
Id.
22. See, e.g., Localio, Variations on $962,258: The Misuse of Data on Medical
Malpractice, LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE, June 1985, at 126.
23. For instance, the New York State Health Commissioner, Dr. David Axelrod,
described the problem of physician incompetence as "overwhelming." N.Y. Times, Feb.
27, 1983, at E6, col. 2. He subsequently promised tighter regulation of professional
standards and enforcement of sanctions against physicians found to be incompetent.
Id., April 3, 1983, at Al, col. 1.
24. See, e.g., the study prepared for the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists. Id., Sept. 11, 1983, at A18, col. 6.
25. Neubauer & Henke, Medical Malpractice Legislation: Laws Based on a
False Premise, TRIAL, Jan. 1985, at 64, 65. See also Lacayo, The Malpractice Blues,
TIME, Feb. 24, 1986, at 60. This author presents some interesting data:
If doctors cry that between 1980 and 1984 the average malpractice award
jumped 63% to $660,123, lawyers may retort that half of all awards made in
that period were below an unchanging median sum of $200,000. [In 1980,
the median sum was also $200,000.] The average annual charge for mal-
practice insurance coverage may have increased 79% between 1976 and
1984, but doctors' total income went up 89% at the same time.
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the malpractice "crises" of the 1970's and 1980's are actually manu-
factured hoaxes perpetrated either by insurance companies attempting
to increase profits,2 6 or by physicians hoping to minimize external regu-
lation of the medical profession.2"
The validity of the above allegations or of possible alternative ex-
planations for the existence of the medical malpractice crises is essen-
tially irrelevant. It is all too clear that physicians, insurers, legislators,
the media, and, as will be illustrated, now even the judiciary all believe
in the existence of a 1980's crisis scenario. Further, these diverse
groups believe that the crisis is directly linked to the state of contempo-
rary medical malpractice law.
In general terms, the crisis legislation of the 1970's was designed
to freeze the development of substantive medical malpractice law.
Comparisons between this area of tort law and the development of the
liability of manufacturers for product defects were all too easy to
make. The courts nurtured products liability doctrine from a situation
of nonliability, 3 through a period of negligence liability29 (buttressed
by res ipsa loquitur ° and warranty 1 doctrines), to a strict liability
regime3 2 based in some states upon a sophisticated risk-benefit analy-
sis." Parallels to medical malpractice law were obvious. Progression in
that area started from the original establishment of liability based on
custom. 34 From that position came the painfully slow dismemberment
of the "locality" rule 35 in favor of a national standard of care.36 Next
came the increasingly imaginative use of res ipsa loquitur"7 followed
Id. Lacayo also graphically describes the base data used for his 79%-89% allegations.
"Average insurance premium paid by doctors: 1976 - $4,700; 1984 - $8,400. Insurance
premium paid . . . as a percent of ... income: 1976 - 4.4%; 1984-4.2%." Id.
26. Baldwin, The Phony Medical Malpractice "Crisis," TRIAL, Apr. 1985, at 4.
See also Londrigan, The Medical Malpractice "Crisis": Underwriting Losses and
Windfall Profits, TRIAL, May 1985, at 22; Sepler, Professional Malpractice Litigation
Crises: Danger or Distortion?, 15 FORUM 493 (1980).
27. See, e.g., Gesler, Aiken, Gleisner, Domnitz & Antoine, Medical Malpractice:
Eliminating the Myths, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 259, 262-66 (1985).
28. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. D. 1852).
29. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
30. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
31. E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
32. Strict liability followed the case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377
P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (en banc), and the publication of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965).
33. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 457-58 (Cal. 1978).
34. Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B.D. 1767).
35. Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131 (1880).
36. See, e.g., Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555 (D.C. 1979).
37. See, e.g., Clark v. Gibbons, 426 P.2d 525 (Cal. 1967) (en banc); Quintal v.
Laurel Grove Hosp., 397 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1964) (en banc); Ybarra v. Spangard, 154
P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944); Anderson v. Somberg, 338 A.2d I (N.J. 1975). See also Rub-
samen, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California Medical Malpractice Law-Expansion of a
19861
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by flirtation with non-custom-based standards. 38 This in turn led to the
expansion of the informed consent doctrine, designed to achieve com-
pensation in cases in which the medical procedures themselves were not
negligently performed. 9 Finally came the explicit judicial enthusiasm
for the imposition of strict liability in medical malpractice cases. 0
Although some state legislatures involved themselves in more com-
prehensive reforms, the typical 1970's crisis legislation seemed intent
on retaining the traditional approaches to medical malpractice litiga-
tion.4 1 The dominance of the custom standard was reaffirmed,42 and in
some states, forms of the locality rule received statutory endorsement.
43
Any further development of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was denied
by clearly maintaining the burden of proof on the plaintiff." Moreover,
some states mandated a custom (expert testimony) standard, 5 rather
than a "need to know" test,46 in informed consent cases.
There were two other salient features of the 1970's reforms that
did not have a direct impact upon substantive malpractice law. First,
many state legislatures changed the accrual date for the malpractice
statutes of limitation from one based on the discovery of the malprac-
tice, to one based on the occurrence of the injury-causing event.47 Sec-
Doctrine to the Bursting Point, 14 STAN. L. REv. 251 (1962).
38, See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Mem. Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253
(Ill. 1965); Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (en banc).
39. See Meisel, The Expansion of Liability for Medical Accidents: From Negli-
gence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REV. 51 (1977).
40. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065, 1067 (E.D.
Wis. 1973); Clark v. Gibbons, 426 P.2d 525, 535 (Cal. 1967) (en banc) (Tobriner, J.,
concurring); Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 984 (Wash. 1974) (en banc) (Utter, J.,
concurring).
41. For detailed summaries of 1970's (and early 1980's) crisis legislation, see
Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis. 36 MD. L. REV. 489
(1977); Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitu-
tional "Quid Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 143 (1981); Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medi-
cal Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417. For a functional analysis, see Bell, Legis-
lative Intrusions into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice: Thoughts About the
Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939 (1984).
42. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.290 (Supp. 1986) (legislative rever-
sal of result in Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (en banc)).
43. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2614(A)(1) (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 8.01-
581.20 (1984). Cf ALA. CODE § 6-5-484(a) (1977) (statutory language "in the same
general neighborhood" judicially modified into a national standard). See Zills v.
Brown, 382 So. 2d 528 (Ala. 1980).
44. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.540(b) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.45(4)
(West Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1908 (Supp. 1985). But see OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 76, § 21 (West Supp. 1985) (Oklahoma legislature bucked the judicial trend
and codified res ipsa loquitur).
45. See, e.g., ARK. STAT, ANN. § 34-2615 (Supp. 1985).
46. See generally Annot., 88 A.L.R. 3d 1008, 1034 (1978 & Supp. 1985).
47. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2616 (Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-
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ond, some state legislatures experimented with provisions designed ei-
ther to "chill" or delay litigation, or to encourage settlement,
depending upon one's perspective. These mandated procedural hurdles
that had to be cleared prior to the filing of a medical malpractice suit.
Typical of this type of legislation were requirements of prior notice of
intent to sue 8 and submission of claims to pretrial review or screening
panels.4"
Three critical features of the second malpractice crisis and result-
ing legislation unfold. First, the legislative emphasis has moved from
containment of tort law to reforms designed to roll back tort law's
reach and effectiveness in the medical arena. In this regard, and no
doubt based on a belief that the judiciary has lost control over damage
awards, there has been intensified interest among legislators to modify
the traditional damage structure in malpractice cases. Examples of this
tendency include the abrogation of the collateral source rule;50 the in-
stitution of a periodic payments structure; 51 the elimination of specific
monetary amounts from ad damnum clauses;52 the introduction of a
damage ceiling (or cap), either for noneconomic damages53 or for dam-
ages generally;54 and the modification of the attorney fee structure, ei-
9.5-3-1 (Burns Supp. 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:4 (1983). Cf. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1985). California uses a dual approach which provides that
the time for the commencement of action shall be (1) three years after the date of
injury, or (2) one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first. Alabama uses a
similar approach with a two-year or six-month rule. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-482(a)
(1977). The insurance industry similarly prepared itself for change by moving from
occurrence to claims-made policies. See Abraham, supra note 41, at 492-93.
48. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34.2617 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
364(a) (West 1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:5 (1983); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.2-
A (1984).
49. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-9-1 to -10 (Burns 1983 & Supp. 1985).
See also Harlan, Virginia's New Medical Malpractice Review Panel and Some Ques-
tions It Raises, 11 U. RICH. L. REV. 51 (1976); Note, The Massachusetts Medical
Malpractice Statute. A Constitutional Perspective, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1289
(1977).
50. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (Supp. 1984); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507-C:71 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-34 (1985).
51. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2619(D) (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 667.7 (West 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6864 (Supp. 1984); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7IV (1983). Compare ALA. CODE § 6-5-486 (1977) (creating a
simple stage payments structure without any provision for adjustment or cessation).
52. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-483 (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2618 (Supp.
1985); IND, CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-1-6 (Burns Supp. 1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, §
60C (Michie/Law Co-op. Supp. 1985).
53. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:711 (1977) ("non-economic
losses"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Baldwin 1984) (general damages). Be-
cause of the traditional function of pain and suffering damages, this also may be seen
as an attack on attorneys' fees.
54. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-2-1 to -7 (Burns 1983 & Supp. 1985)
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ther by introducing a sliding-scale for contingency fees55or by mandat-
ing that costs should follow the cause. 56
Second, and as outlined below, a discernible shift is perceptible in
judicial attitudes towards such "Crisis II" legislation. Third, there
seems to be a growing interest in replacing the tort law system as the
vehicle for adjudicating medical malpractice cases with various alterna-
tive dispute resolution systems. Several states have embraced arbitra-
tion as a device suitable for this purpose. Arbitration is supposedly
quick, cost efficient, fair, and constitutional. Whether today's malprac-
tice arbitration schemes in fact possess these advantages is the subject
of this Article.
B. Crisis Legislation in the Courts
Both sets of crisis statutes have been subject to constitutional re-
view 57 on grounds as diverse as equal protection, due process, denial of
the right to a jury trial, access to the courts, special privilege legisla-
tion, and the separation of powers doctrine.5 8 The most frequently used
constitutional attack has focused upon the particular legislation's con-
formity with state and federal guarantees of equal protection. With re-
gard to the constitutional review analysis employed in these cases, there
has been little judicial dissent from the view that no fundamental
rights5" or inherently suspect classifications are at issue. Accordingly,
there has been general agreement" that the appropriate standard of
(five hundred thousand dollar total damages cap; one hundred thousand dollars per
provider, excess liability payable from general fund); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.15 (1984)
(one million dollar cap on all recovery). See generally Richards, Statutes Limiting
Medical Malpractice Damages, FED'N INS. CouNS. Q. 247 (Spring 1982); Note, Medi-
cal Malpractice Legislation: The Kansas Response to the Medical Malpractice Crisis,
23 WASHBURN L.J. 566, 569-82 (1984).
55. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146(a) (West Supp. 1986); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6865 (Supp. 1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:8 I & V
(1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.604(a) (Purdon Supp. 1985). Also, note the
slightly different approach of IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-5-1(a) (Burns 1983) (maxi-
mum attorney's fee is 15% of patient's award).
56. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.56 (West Supp. 1985). See also MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(e) (1984) (assessing costs to party rejecting pretrial re-
view panel determination).
57. See generally Learner, supra note 41, at 151-205; Richards, supra note 54;
Comment, Medical Malpractice: A Sojourn Through the Jurisprudence Addressing
Limitation of Liability, 30 LOYOLA L. REV. 119, 121-37 (1984).
58. See generally Annot., 80 A.L.R. 3d 583 §§ 3-6, 8-11 (1977 & Supp. 1984)
(damage caps and pretrial panels); Annot., 12 A.L. R.4th 23 (1982 & Supp. 1985)
(contingency fee scales). In addition, see the cases cited in American Bank & Trust
Co. v. Community Hosp., 683 P.2d 670, 677 n.10 (Cal. 1984) (en banc).
59. Cf Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 975 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) (holding
that the right to bring a medical malpractice action is a fundamental right).
60. Cf Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270
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review for such crisis legislation is the rational basis or rational connec-
tion test."1
This suggested judicial trend may be explained on more than one
ground. First, recent examples of crisis legislation have tended to cur-
tail, not the judicial control of the malpractice process, but the plain-
tiffs' awards in actual malpractice cases. It may be suggested that, just
as plaintiffs are less likely to be able to attack these statutes on the
grounds that they deprive the litigant of due process, access to the
courts, and the right to trial by jury, so also is judicial disfavor towards
the legislation unlikely to be as predetermined. Second, there has been
a notable (and, presumably, judicially noticed) nationwide legislative
persistance in maintaining a barrage of crisis legislation. Even hostile
courts have been hesitant to enter the debate over whether any mal-
practice crisis indeed exists.62 These continuing waves of legislation
must influence the judicial decisionmaking process.63
Current judicial responses to the medical malpractice crises may
be illustrated and measured by an examination of the following four
recent decisions of the Supreme Court of California: American Bank &
Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 64 Barme v. Wood,66 Roa v. Lodi
N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978) (cases applying tests of intermediate "fair and substantial"
relationship or close correspondence between classification scheme and legislative
goals).
61. "[T]he statute must be upheld if there exists any conceivable set of facts
under which the classification rationally furthered a legitimate legislative objective."
Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 452 N.E.2d 1337, 1338 (Ohio 1983) (citations
omitted). See also Otero v. Zouhar, 697 P.2d 493 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
62. "In the absence of a 'suspect classification' or a 'fundamental right,' courts
will not second-guess the legislature as to the wisdom of or necessity for legislation."
Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 831 (N.H. 1980) (citations omitted). See also Amer-
ican Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 683 P.2d 670, 679 (Cal. 1984) (en banc).
Cf Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1976) (remanded for factual
determination of egistence of malpractice crisis). Of course, if the contrary conclusion
is reached that a "fundamental right" is threatened, any such legislative conclusions
are "fair game." See, e.g., Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 976-79 (Ariz. 1984).
63. For examples of the apparent judicial acknowledgment of the existence of a
malpractice crisis, see American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. 683 P.2d 670,
677-78 (Cal. 1984) (en banc); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d 585, 589-90
(Ind. 1980).
64. 683 P.2d 670 (Cal. 1984), vacating American Bank & Trust Co. v. Commu-
nity Hosp., 660 P.2d 829 (Cal. 1983). Interestingly, the rehearing represented an ab-
rupt about-face by the court on the question of equal protection. In the earlier hearing,
the court had outlined the history of the medical malpractice crisis in California:
The medical malpractice insurance industry in California had severe
problems for many years because it had failed since 1957 to charge doctors
premiums high enough to allow sufficient reserves to be set aside to meet
future claims. By 1975, the crisis affected the public health of the state's
residents. Because the number of malpractice claims and the dollar amount
of judgments had risen sharply since 1968, insurers were paying out $180
for each $100 in premiums collected. As a result, they were either aban-
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Medical Group, Inc.,66 and Fein v. Permanente Medical Group.7
These decisions upheld various provisions of California's Medical In-
jury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA).68 Specifically,
these cases affirmed the constitutionality of legislation providing for the
periodic payment of future damages, 69 the modification of the collat-
eral source rule,70 the limitations on contingency fees,71 and a cap on
doning the malpractice market or raising premiums by several hundred
percent.
Nor could the medical profession afford to absorb these increases or to
pass them on to their patients. Only 27,000 doctors in California carried
independent medical malpractice insurance, and this small number could
not absorb the entire increase. Moreover, because doctors received a sub-
stantial proportion of their fees from the government, they could only pass
the increases on to a limited number of patients who paid their own ex-
penses, and these patients were unable to shoulder the entire burden. Some
physicians, believing that they could neither absorb the additional premiums.
nor pass them on to their patients, went on strike, and medical care in cer-
tain sections of the state came to a virtual halt.
The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act [MICRA] . . . was the
Legislature's response. Generally speaking, it addressed the problems by en-
acting reforms in three basic areas: medical quality assurance, medical mal-
practice insurance, and medical malpractice litigation ....
In the area of medical malpractice litigation MICRA directed its atten-
tion to four basic concerns: time limitations, damages, attorney's fees, and
arbitration.
660 P.2d at 832 (footnotes and citations omitted).
With this backdrop, the court considered an equal protection claim pertaining to a
MICRA provision permitting the periodic payment of "future damages" when those
damages were $50,000 or more against a provider in a malpractice case. The court
applied "the familiar rational-relationship test, which is used to test the constitutional-
ity of economic regulations," in order to "conduct a serious and genuine inquiry into
the correspondence between the [suspect] classification and the legislative goals." Id. at
837 (citations omitted). The plaintiff did not challenge the notion that the primary
motivation of the legislation, the promotion of public health by the containment of
medical costs, was proper. Instead, it challenged the factual assumptions underlying the
statute, asserting that there was, in fact, no malpractice crisis and that the legislature's
premise that the cost of medical care could be contained by a reduction in the premi-
ums paid by hospitals was erroneous., Id. at 839-40. The court agreed with this latter
assertion, finding the cost effect of premium reduction to be "negligible at best." Id. at
840. The provision was held to be unconstitutional.
In the rehearing, however, that view could be found only in the dissenting opin-
ions, as the majority chose not to examine the factual basis for the provision. See infra
notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
65. 689 P.2d 446 (Cal. 1984).
66. 695 P.2d 164 (Cal. 1985) (en banc).
67. 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214
(1985).
68. Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975, 1975 Cal. Stat. 3949 (2d
Exec. Session) (codified with amendments in scattered sections of the California Code).
69. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 667.7 (West 1980).




The MICRA provisions were attacked on various constitutional
grounds including due process,"7 right to jury trial,7 4 the separation of
powers doctrine,75 and the first amendment.76 Central to the disposition
of each of the cases, however, were the equal protection challenges. All
of these challenges failed by narrow majorities .7  For a court so obvi-
ously divided on the issue of validity, there was basic agreement
through the first three decisions that the appropriate level of review
was the less than rigorous rational basis approach.7 8 It was not until
Fein that Justice Mosk, in his dissenting opinion, broke ranks and
adopted an intermediate "fair and substantial" approach.7 9 For the
most part, then, it was on the application of the rational basis standard
that the courts were divided.
The majority's opinion in these cases was accurately reflected in
American Bank.80 That court concluded that "since there was a ra-
tional and legitimate basis for the Legislature's decision to attempt to
reduce insurance costs in the medical malpractice area and since
[MICRA is] rationally related to that objective, the Legislature did not
violate equal protection principles in limiting [MICRA's] application to
medical malpractice actions."81 In dissent, Chief Justice Bird decried
71. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1986).
72. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1986). Section 3333.2 was upheld in
Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985) (en banc), appeal dis-
missed, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985). Fein also dealt with the constitutionality of another
MICRA modification, the collateral source rule. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.1(a)
(West Supp. 1986).73. Fein, 695 P.2d at 679; Roa, 695 P.2d at 166; Barme, 689 P.2d at 448; Amer-
ican Bank, 683 P.2d at 675.
74. American Bank, 683 P.2d at 680.
75. Roa, 695 P.2d at 172.
76. Id. at 167 n.5.
77. All were four to three decisions except Barme (5-2).
78. See, e.g., American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 683 P.2d 670
(Cal. 1984) (en banc) (majority and dissent disagreed about the constitutionality of the
statute, but nevertheless did agree that rational basis test was appropriate standard of
review). See also Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1985) (fed-
eral equal protection challenge to MICRA damage cap; rational basis test appropriate
barring the finding of a suspect class). But see Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, 695 P.2d
165, 172-86 (Cal. 1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). In her dissent, Chief Justice Bird
suggested that the strict scrutiny standard should be utilized because she was of the
opinion that the contingency fee sliding scale violated the right to petition the govern-
ment for the redress of grievances, which is protected by the first amendment. She
found it unnecessary to decide this issue, however, since she decided that the statutory
provision could not withstand even the much less strict rational basis standard. Id. at
183.
79. Fein, 695 P.2d at 694-95 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
80. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 683 P.2d 670 (Cal. 1984)
(en bane).
81. Id. at 679 (footnote omitted).
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the majority's approach as reducing "the rational relationship test to a
rubber stamp." 82 Believing that the MICRA provision at issue in
American Bank "burdens an overinclusive class of tort victims and ben-
efits an overinclusive class of tortfeasors," ' she concluded that "[tihis
is not the 'substantial and rational' relation between classification and
legislative purpose that is required under the equal protection guaran-
tee of the California Constitution."' Indeed, Chief Justice Bird char-
acterized the majority's version of the rational relationship test as
[precluding] any consideration of the actual impact of the chal-
lenged legislation. It ignores both the character of the burdened
class and the nature of the interest at stake.
To invalidate discriminatory legislation under the major-
ity's version of the rational relationship test, this court would have to
conclude that the Legislature acted "irrationally" in passing it.85
For Justice Mosk, the other persistent dissenting voice, the route
to determining a violation of the equal protection principle was some-
what different. The majority in American Bank had asserted that "the
constitutionality of a measure under the equal protection clause does
not depend on a court's assessment of the empirical success or failure
of the measure's provisions. 88 For Justice Mosk, however, such an
analysis was vital:
The assumption that there exists a significant relationship between
the reduction in malpractice premiums and a meaningful contain-
ment of medical costs to the general public lies at the heart of
MICRA. Yet, a comparison between the amount of such premiums
and the cost of hospital care in the years following the enactment of
the legislation demonstrates that this premise is erroneous.8
In conclusion, it seems that the "Californian Quartet" has not only
upheld one of the most comprehensive pieces of second generation crisis
legislation, but has confirmed a growing judicial receptiveness to nearly
all legislative attempts to mitigate the medical malpractice crisis. If the
"Steelworkers Trilogy" 88 heralded a new era of judicial deference to
82. Id. at 696 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 699.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 696. See also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 442
(1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The State's rationale must be something more
than the exercise of a strained imagination; while the connection between means and
ends need not be precise, it, at the least, must have some objective basis.")
86. American Bank, 683 P.2d at 679.
87. Id. at 685.
88. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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the arbitration of industrial relations, this California Quartet similarly
represents the current judicial disinterest in the future of malpractice
regulation.
III. ARBITRATION AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
In the world of alternative dispute resolution as applied to medical
malpractice claims, the term "arbitration" is somewhat chameleonic,
maybe even Janus-faced. The use (or misuse) of the label "arbitra-
tion," however, is not the product of neglect.8 9 Rather, it is an attempt
to clothe a subject-specific dispute resolution system with the respecta-
bility long enjoyed by commercial and labor arbitration.
In the context of the malpractice crises, the term "arbitration" has
been used to describe various dispute resolution mechanisms.9" For the
purposes of this Article, however, it will connote either a voluntarily
executed contractual agreement to submit discovered malpractice
claims to arbitration, in which the award is final,91 or a similar agree-
ment covering undiscovered as well as discovered claims.92 These types
of agreements alone comply with the classical tenets of arbitration as
being both voluntary in its inception and binding in its award.9 3 They
89. Cf REPORT, supra note 2, at 91-92 (Commission's findings that most people
believe arbitration to be an effective settlement tool for malpractice cases).
90. Arbitration mechanisms may be conceptualized as follows:
Type A: An "arbitration" panel having mandatory exclusive and original jurisdic-
tion over malpractice claims. The award of the panel is final. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
26, §§ 4110, 4113(6) (Supp. 1984).
Type B: An "arbitration" (or "pretrial" or "professional liability review" or "mal-
practice review" or "mediation") panel having exclusive original jurisdiction over mal-
practice claims. Upon appeal by either party, a trial de novo is held, at which the
finding(s) of the panel may or may not be admitted into evidence, with or without a
modified burden of proof and with or without a costs penalty in the event that the
panel's findings are confirmed. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-2A-
01 to -09 (1984 & Supp. 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.101 to .606 (Purdon
Supp. 1985) (declared unconstitutional),
Type C: The same as Type B, except that submission of the claim to the panel is
voluntary.
Type D: Judicially mandated "arbitration" of malpractice claims on a case-by-
case basis. The award may or may not be final. See, e.g., Broderick, Compulsory Arbi-
tration: One Better Way, 69 A.B.A. J. 64 (1983). See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 484.73
(West Supp. 1985) (not a malpractice-specific statute, but rather, a general judicial
alternative dispute resolution system); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.06.010, .020
(Supp. 1985); G. WILNER, supra note 1, § 1.03.
Type E: A voluntarily executed contractual agreement to submit discovered mal-
practice claims to arbitration. The award is final.
Type F: The same as Type E, except that the agreement covers undiscovered as
well as discovered claims.
91. This is a Type E arbitration mechanism. See supra note 90.
92. This is a Type F arbitration mechanism. See supra note 90.
93. "Arbitration" has been defined as follows:
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also function as a conclusive substitute for litigation, rather than as an
additional component of the traditional litigation process.' 4
Arbitration and pretrial review of medical malpractice claims
serve different legislative goals. At the most general level, both are
designed to freeze or slow the acceleration of the size of malpractice
insurance premiums. The effect of pretrial review, however, is to chill
plaintiff interest in pursuing marginal claims,9 5 both practically and
psychologically, and to encourage settlement by forcing additional
plaintiff expenditure without providing for concomitant recovery. Arbi-
tration, on the other hand, is viewed primarily as a constitutionally safe
method of avoiding jury determinations of liability and quantum of
damages. At a lower normative (interpretative) level of scrutiny,
whereas mandatory pretrial review might be thought subject to -restric-
tive judicial interpretation, this is in stark contrast to the oft-cited judi-
cial enthusiasm for voluntary arbitration, coupled with judicial hesi-
tancy to interfere with the arbitrators' views of the scope of an
arbitration agreement.
There are two distinct juridical bases9 for the execution and en-
forcement of medical malpractice arbitration agreements. These agree-
A process for the decision of conflicts by persons other than governmental
judicial officers. The process leads to a decision by the "arbitrators" which is
binding upon the parties, and this distinguishes it from mediation or concili-
ation where the role of the third parties is to bring the contending parties to
settle their disagreement themselves.
Arbitration is always voluntary, in the sense that no one can, as he can
in a judicial law suit, be forced either to take part or lose the dispute. But a
commitment to arbitration, of either a then existing dispute, or some or all
disputes to arise in the future, and whether made by special agreement or
pursuant to an "arbitration" clause in a contract, will ordinarily be en-
forced, i.e., a court will order a party who has so agreed to go to arbitration,
and bar him from a judicial determination.
Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 2051-52 (1985)
(emphasis in original). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (5th ed. 1979) ("The
reference of a dispute to an impartial (third) person chosen by the parties to the dis-
pute who agree in advance to abide by the arbitrator's award issued after a hearing at
which both parties have an opportunity to be heard."); G. WILNER, supra note 1, §
1.01 ("It is axiomatic that commercial arbitration is based on a voluntary agreement of
the parties; only then can the concept of arbitration be well understood.").
94. "Opportunity for de novo trial is what principally distinguishes court-an-
nexed arbitration ... from private arbitration conducted pursuant to the agreement of
the parties .... The very essence of the term 'arbitration' in the latter context connotes
a binding award." Blanton v. Womancare Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 648 (Cal. 1985) (en
banc) (citations omitted). See also Comment, The Constitutionality of Medical Mal-
practice Mediation Panels: A Maryland Perspective, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 75, 78 (1979).
95. Claims are adjudged marginal either because of the low quantum claimed, or
the low probability of success at trial, or both.
96. A third basis is arbitration at common law. Absence of judicial enforcement
prior to the award, however, makes it essentially irrelevant in the malpractice context.
See generally G. WILNER, supra note 1, § 3.02.
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ments will be made either under general state arbitration statutes, 97
which are themselves often total or partial adoptions of the Uniform
Arbitration Act of 1955,9" or under a specific medical malpractice arbi-
tration statute. 9 Typically such a statute will define the parties who
may execute a malpractice arbitration agreement and its subject mat-
ter applicability and will regulate certain substantive provisions in the
agreement and the style and content of preexecution disclosure. Some
statutes go so far as to dictate the selection process for the arbitrators
and some aspects of the arbitration procedure itself.
There are three basic reasons for enacting specific malpractice ar-
bitration legislation. First, it permits some or all aspects of the arbitra-
tion process to be tailored to suit the special nature of the medical
claim. 1°0 Second, it offers the opportunity to provide for a certain de-
gree of consumer protection-type regulation, both prior to'01 and fol-
lowing execution of the agreement to arbitrate.10 2 Third, and most im-
portant, a state's enactment of such a statute will affect the question of
whether a medical malpractice claim is arbitrable in that state. 0 s
It does not necessarily follow, however, that the issue of arbi-
trability will remain open in those states that do not enact specific leg-
97. Id. §§ 4.01-.02.
98. Unif. Arbitration Act, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1978 & Supp. 1985). See generally The
Uniform Arbitration Act, 48 Mo. L. REV. 137 (1983). For a nonuniform state's general
arbitration statute, see Feldman, Arbitration Modernized-The New California Arbi-
tration Act, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 413 (1961). For a state-by-state breakdown of arbitra-
tion statutes and their potential for utilization in the malpractice context, see
Wadlington, Alternatives to Litigation IV: The Law of Arbitration in the U.S., in RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 346, 350-423 app.
99. As of 1985, 11 states had enacted specific malpractice arbitration statutes.
ALA. CODE § 6-5-485 (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 09-55-535 (1983); CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE
§ 1295 (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-11, -112 (1981); Health Care Arbitration
Act §§ 1-14, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 201-214 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4230-:4236 (West 1983); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 600.5040-.5065
(1975); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.21 -. 26 (Baldwin 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 21-25B-1 to -26 (1979 & Supp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7001-7008
(Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.1 to -581.12:2 (1984). See generally Ladimer,
Medical Malpractice Claims, in ARBITRATION 301 (A. Widiss ed. 1979). The oft-cited
Maine, ME. REV. STATS. ANN. tit. 24, § 2701-2715 (1977), and North Dakota, N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-29.1 (Supp. 1983), malpractice arbitration statutes have been re-
pealed. For a proposed model act, see Note, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: Time
for a Model Act, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 454, 495-501 (1981). See also 9A AM. JUR. 2D
LEGAL FORMS Hospitals & Asylums § 136.103 (1985) (model arbitration agreement).
100. For example, it might be specified that one of the arbitrators should be a
health care provider.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 174-206. Note, however, that some gen-
eral arbitration statutes do provide a modicum of consumer protection disclosure. See,
e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.460 (Supp. 1984).
102. See infra text accompanying notes 214-41.
103. For the various meanings of "arbitrability," see infra text accompanying
notes 110-12.
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islation. For example, some general arbitration statutes specifically ex-
clude agreements to arbitrate tort or personal injury claims.1"4 Other
statutes permit only the submission of postclaim (existing controversy)
agreements, 105 and still others mandate a preexecution disclosure model
that would make the formation of a malpractice arbitration agreement
unlikely. 10
Of those states that have enacted specific malpractice arbitration
statutes, Alabama, 07 Georgia,108 and Vermont' 09 stand out in permit-
ting the arbitration of existing medical malpractice disputes, while
prohibiting agreements to resolve future disputes through arbitration.
IV. LEGAL PROBLEMS WITH MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION
-AN ANALYTICAL MODEL
When a court is petitioned to compel or to stay arbitration in a
malpractice case, a multitude of different legal issues may have to be
resolved. An analytical model, illustrated hypothetically, may aid in
comprehending the maze that lies ahead.
Suppose that Plaintiff (P) is admitted to Hospital (D) for medical
treatment and that P executes an agreement with D, which provides
that all claims which she might have relating to her care will be sub-
mitted to arbitration. Suppose further that a problem of some type
arises, and P files a malpractice suit naming D as a defendant. D, rely-
ing on the terms of their agreement, files a motion to compel arbitra-
tion. P wishing to litigate her claim, files a motion to stay arbitration.
Our first problem is whether this general type of medical contro-
versy is susceptible to arbitration at all. In other words, at an abstract
(i.e., not fact-sensitive) level, is this general type of factual pattern
amenable to resolution through arbitration?" 0 Only in those jurisdic-
104. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-511 (Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401
(1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(b)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985). See also S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(b)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985) (specific prohibition against
"lawyer-client" or "doctor-patient" agreements).
105. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (Supp. 1984). Note also that Missouri
excludes "contracts of insurance and contracts of adhesion." Id.
106. See, e.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 224 (c) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
107. ALA. CODE § 6-5-485(a) (1975).
108. GA. CODE ANN. 9-9-112 (1982).
109. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002(a) (Supp. 1985).
110. As one court has described the issue, "[a]doption of an affirmative policy
toward enforcement of arbitration agreements has never implied, however, that all
types of disputes are subject to arbitration." Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192,
1202 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
For the tort or malpractice lawyer, this first arbitrability issue may be seen as
somewhat analogous to the "duty of care" issue. In other words, the tort ques-
tion-does this general type of allegation of blameworthy conduct invite judicial resolu-
tion (or regulation)?-becomes the arbitrability question-do we, the judicial regula-
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tions that have specific malpractice arbitration statutes is this "arbi-
trability as a matter of law" issue quickly resolved. Yet even in those
jurisdictions, this general or first level arbitrability issue is not so much
resolved as it is replaced with a second level of inquiry. This second
level is a fact-sensitive investigation into whether the agreement in
question falls within the terms of the jurisdiction's malpractice arbitra-
tion facilitating legislation.
There is a complex interrelationship between these two levels of
inquiry. In the first place, if our judge determines that the agreement
at issue does not fall within the terms of the facilitating legislation, the
issue of arbitrability returns to the first level for determination. Second,
even in jurisdictions where there is a malpractice arbitration statute,
our judge may succumb to temptation and make an initial subconscious
(or "off-camera") determination about the general appropriateness of
malpractice arbitration. This will then color her view of the reach or
scope of the statute-explicitly, the second level of inquiry. Even if our
judge finds that the hypothetical circumstances described above are ar-
bitrable as a matter of law, or that the statute involved covers this gen-
eral type of claim, a final issue or third level of inquiry into arbi-
trability remains. The judge (or, more frequently, the arbitrator) must
examine the peculiar circumstances of the case to determine whether
the claim falls within the ambit of the agreement to arbitrate. At a
fact-intensive, contractual interpretative level, is this particular contro-
versy covered by this particular agreement to arbitrate?"' It is impor-
tant to note that the three arbitration levels are conceptually divisible
into three ascending levels of factual specificity. Only when the answers
to the inquiries generated by each succeeding level are positive is the
agreement to arbitrate enforceable."'
Unfortunately for our judge in the above hypothetical, however,
her inquiry must continue. Not only must the agreement be "arbitra-
ble," but it must be "valid." This validity determination, like that of
tors, object to this general type of allegation being resolved in a nonjudicial forum? See
generally Henderson, supra note 2, at 971-76.
111. Cf. G. WILNER, supra note 1, § 13.08. Wilner does not distinguish between
the different types or levels of arbitrability. Note that the different levels of arbi-
trability identified do not correspond to the substantive/procedural arbitrability distinc-
tion sometimes drawn. See, e.g., F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 215-16.
112. Two further points should be noted. First, some malpractice arbitration is-
sues, but not the issue of arbitrability, have come before the courts in jurisdictions that
do not (or did not then) have specific malpractice arbitration statutes. See, e.g., Doyle
v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d I (Cal. 1965) (en banc); Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal.
Rptr. 775 (Ct. App. 1976); Zupan v. Firestone, 457 N.Y.S.2d 43 (App. Div. 1982),
affd, 450 N.E.2d 245 (N.Y. 1983).
Second, because of the general judicial policy favoring arbitration, the third fact-
intensive level of arbitrability will often be left to the arbitrator alone to decide. See
generally Henderson, supra note 2, at 971-76.
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arbitrability, is characterized by three specificity levels.
At the first level of the validity inquiry, a judge must evaluate the
general constitutionality of the statute facilitating arbitration. The
judge must consider possible violations of due process, equal protection,
and the right to a jury trial before concluding for or against general
validity.
The second level is more fact-sensitive and focuses primarily on
the terms of the agreement. For example, if P were compelled to sign a
preclaim arbitration agreement as a condition to treatment by D, then
a substantive conscionability question would arise.
Similarly, but even more factually focused, are procedural con-
scionability issues. If the actual preexecution disclosure of the agree-
ment's nature or effect was insufficient to give full understanding (for
example, if P signed without explaining her surrender of the right to
jury trial), then the judge might properly grant the motion to stay
arbitration.
As between P and D, then, validity, like arbitrability, will depend
on a multiplicity of gradated, specific determinations of fact and pol-
icy. 113 These evaluations, however, must not be allowed to converge. It
is vital that traditional tenets of arbitration law, such as judicial defer-
ence to the arbitrator's views on the scope of the agreement to arbi-
trate, should not be allowed to bleed off into the distinct public policy-
based inquiries that are clearly and appropriately within the realm of
judicial scrutiny.
V. GENERAL ARBITRABILITY AS A MATTER OF LAW
It is arguable whether arbitration is appropriate in the malpractice
context at all. In the first place, arbitration classically is applied to
claims or controversies arising out of a contract that includes an arbi-
tration clause. Yet, while it is correct that the patient-provider relation-
113. The review model used here is illustrated by the following schematic:
DECISIONAL ISSUE
A. Arbitrability B. Validity
TYPE OF JUDICIAL
SCRUTINY
I. Abstract Arbitrability as a Matter Constitutionality
of Law of Facilitating Statute










ship may be grounded in contract, the contract is not the sole source of
the duties imposed upon providers by the courts. If it were, the courts
would hardly have objected to contractual modifications of those du-
ties. '"4 Rather, responsibility for the regulation of the quality of medi-
cal care has been allocated to the torts system.
The distinction between contract law and tort law drawn here is
not an idle, semantic one. Neither is this merely another skirmish in
the contract versus torts territorial dispute. Instead, it is an issue that
goes to the heart of the arbitration process and to the function of the
arbitrator within that process. The arbitrator is a "contract reader.' '"1
He may be a highly competent and respected interpreter, but he is not
a regulator." 6 The judge and jury in a malpractice case do not and
should not speak for the parties in their contractual relationship. 17
They speak about that relationship, applying normative values and yes,
even sentiments, distinct from it."'
Second, there are important consumer protection and accident cost
avoidance reasons for refusing to allow malpractice litigation to be sup-
planted by arbitration." 9 For the protection of consumers, arbitration
should be permitted only when there has been regulation of the mode
114. See generally Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 704 (1966).
115. See St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second
Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, in ARBITRATION-1977, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE THIRTIETH ANNUAL MEETING, NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 29, 30 (B. Dennis
& G. Somers eds. 1978).
[Members of the Academy] fall into two distinct groups: (a) those who,
with refreshing modesty, call themselves simple contract readers, and (b)
those, somewhat less modest, who are prepared to go beyond the contract
and to read and interpret laws, statutes, regulations, and anything else (in-
cluding Playboy, Playgirl, Penthouse and Hustler) that the parties, in their
infinite wisdom, think pertinent to the issues.
Id. at 30. Cf. Gold, Small Claims Grievance Arbitration, in ARBITRATION-1983,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING, NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBITRA-
TORS 16, 17-18 (J. Stern & B. Dennis eds. 1984). See also Dunsford, The Role and
Function of the Labor Arbitrator, 30 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 109 (1985).
116. Consider, for example, the issues arising when arbitration of allegations of
discrimination is contemplated. See Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimina-
tion Cases: An Empirical Study, in ABITRATION-1975, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING, NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 59, 70-81 (B.
Dennis & G. Somers, eds. 1976). See also Oppenheimer & LaVan, Arbitration
Awards in Discrimination Disputes: An Empirical Analysis, 34 ARBITRATION J. 12
(1979).
117. Compare the role of the arbitrator: "So long as he is dealing with a matter
duly submitted to him, the arbitrator is speaking for the parties, and his award is their
contract." St. Antoine, supra note 115, at 35 (emphasis in original).
118. For similar issues arising in the context of child custody, see Faherty v.
Faherty, 477 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1984); Fence v. Fence, 314 N.Y.S.2d 1016, 1019-20
(Fam. Ct. 1970).
119. Cf Henderson, supra note 2, at 956 ("No doctrine of public policy or rule
of law precludes the use of arbitration in the area of medical services.").
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and content of the provider's disclosure of the nature and impact of
arbitration. 20 With regard to accident avoidance,12' there are impor-
tant public interests involved in the regulation of the health care indus-
try that should militate against the totally private resolution of
claims.' 22 Not only does the litigation system have an important deter-
rence function, 23 but deserving claimants forced to arbitrate may find
themselves at a disadvantage because arbitration proceedings often lack
the usual pretrial tools available to assist plaintiffs in the making of
their cases.' 2'
120. O'Keefe v. South Shore Internal Medicine Assocs., 422 N.Y.S.2d 828, 832
(Sup. Ct. 1979).
121. See generally G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
122. See, e.g., Tatham v. Hoke, 469 F. Supp. 914, 918-19 (W.D. N.C. 1979). Cf.
Note, supra note 99, at 491-93 (stating that "public policy would tend to support arbi-
tration as an alternative to litigation") (footnote omitted). See also City of Boston v.
Boston Patrolmen's A*;s'n, 392 N.E.2d 1202 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (advocating bal-
ancing test between policy issues and subject of arbitration); Baker v. Townsend, 129
Eng. Rep. 169 (1817).
An analogy can be drawn to the arbitration of securities disputes. See, e.g. Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). If the initial premise is accepted that the regulation of
the quality of medical care is of a similar order of societal and economic importance as
the regulation of the securities market, then the Court's opinion in Wilko, a case deal-
ing with the arbitrability of a securities dispute, could perhaps be modified as follows:
Two policies, not easily reconcilable, are involved in this case. [The
states have] afforded participants in [health care] transactions subject to
[their] legislative power an opportunity generally to secure prompt, econom-
ical and adequate solution of controversies through arbitration if the parties
are willing to accept less certainty of legally correct adjustment. On the
other hand, [states have developed malpractice law] to protect the rights of
[patients] and [have] forbidden a waiver of any of those rights. [See, e.g.,
Annot., 6 A.L.R. 3d 704 (1966)]. Recognizing the advantages that prior
agreements for arbitration may provide for the solution of commercial con-
troversies, we decide that the intention of [the states] concerning the [provi-
sion of medical services] is better carried out by holding invalid such an
agreement for arbitration of issues arising [in the malpractice context.]
Id. at 438 (footnote omitted). Cf Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238
(1985) (White, J., concurring); Sacks v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 627 F. Supp. 377
(C.D. Cal. 1985).
123.
After considering both knowns and unknowns of the law of medical mal-
practice, we believe the tort approach provides a significant, and necessary,
deterrent against incompetent and careless rendition of medical services. It
also confers intangible benefits, for example in citizen perceptions of the
justice of imposing liability on those culpably responsible for injuries. If the
tort system offers these benefits imperfectly, we find no evidence that alter-
native general approaches would be superior either in producing cost-effec-
tive medical care or in generating just results.
TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF
SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW, REPORT TO THE AMERICAN BAR As-
SOCIATION 11-32 (1984).
124. See, e.g., O'Keefe v. South Shore Internal Medicine Assocs., 422 N.Y.S.2d
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Finally, compelling the submission of a malpractice claim to arbi-
tration may have the effect of increasing the length and expense of
resolving malpractice disputes. It is extremely unlikely, given the com-
plexity of modern medicine and the reach of modern malpractice law,
that all the potential plaintiffs and defendants will have been parties to
the arbitration agreement. Inefficient multiple proceedings seem
inevitable. 1
25
VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION STATUTES
To make a successful constitutional challenge to a statute facilitat-
ing or regulating arbitration is notoriously difficult.' 26 At the root of
the problem is the "voluntary" nature of the arbitration agreement.
Statutorily facilitated elective agreements are not amenable to "access
to the courts" or "trial by jury" challenges under state constitutions. 27
Moreover, judicial acceptance of the theoretically voluntary nature of
such' 2 8 agreements makes facilitating legislation virtually immune
from equal protection challenge.
In Dickinson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 9 the plaintiff ar-
gued for the correction of an arbitration award otherwise in his favor
because the arbitrator had not awarded him costs. Specifically, he chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a California statute that provided,
"[u]nless the arbitration agreement otherwise provides or the parties to
the agreement otherwise agree, each party to the agreement shall pay
his pro rata share of the expenses and fees .... "13 The court opined
that
[t]here is no denial of equal protection since the parties provided for
arbitration by their own agreement, in order to gain the benefits of
828, 831 (Sup. Ct. 1979). ("[T]he appellate courts have noted that the plaintiff in a
medical malpractice action is most often less likely than the defendant to have knowl-
edge of proper surgical techniques or procedures, medicines and tests.") (citation
omitted).
125. Id.
126. See G. WILNER, supra note 1, § 4.02. See generally Adams & Bell, Alter-
natives to Litigation, I. Constitutionality of Arbitration Statutes, in REPORT, supra
note 2, at 315 app. (dealing with compulsory arbitration models).
127. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583
S.W.2d 107, 1i (1979) (Simeone, J., concurring). See also Opinion of the Justices,
304 A.2d 881, 887 (N.H. 1973) ("[It is clear from the language ... of the ... [state]
constitution that neither the legislature nor the courts, by rules or otherwise, have the
right or power to deny the parties a jury trial without consent. ... ) (emphasis
added).
128. Consider whether the Alaskan arbitration statute is truly voluntary. If the
parties do not agree to arbitrate a claim under ALASKA STAT. § 09-55-535 (1983),
compulsory pretrial "advisory panel" review under § 09-55-536 is triggered.
129. 169 Cal. Rptr. 493 (Ct. App. 1980).
130. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1284.2 (West 1982).
1986J
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
the simplified arbitration process and avoid the disadvantages of
court litigation. The parties could reach their own agreement as to
how the costs of arbitration should be awarded. The Constitution
does not require that costs be awarded in the same manner as in
judicial proceedings. 8 '
Thus, unequal treatment of the arbitrating medical malpractice
claimant as compared to the litigating claimant may be rationalized (or
transparently characterized) as the product of provider-claimant pre-
agreement negotiation, rather than statutory discrimination. A plain-
tiff's challenge will not survive long enough to attract even limited ra-
tional basis review.' 32 It seems likely that the courts are unwilling to
examine the arguably involuntary nature of malpractice arbitration
agreements at the level of constitutional review because there are lower
order normative constructs such as conscionability that are available to
achieve or approximate consensual agreement.
Unless the plaintiff can establish the constitutional invalidity of
the facilitating statute, however, she will be unable to argue that the
claim is nonarbitrable as a matter of law. In the absence of a frontal
attack on the principle of such state facilitation, three alternative ap-
proaches suggest themselves. First, although a state arbitration statute
is not unconstitutional in permitting arbitration, it may be challengea-
ble with regard to the detailed arbitration issues it mandates. Second,
the facilitating statute may be defective because it is unconstitutionally
vague. Finally, the statute may be invalid in practice, rather than in
principle.
The first of these approaches was dealt a possibly fatal blow by the
Supreme Court of Michigan in Morris v. Metriyakool.133 The Michi-
gan medical malpractice arbitration statute, while specifying that exe-
cution of the arbitration agreement was to be voluntary, nevertheless
mandated the composition of the arbitration panel.3 Specifically, the
131. Dickinson, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 494 (citations omitted).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 57-87. See also Eastin v. Broomfield,
570 P.2d 744, 751 (Ariz. 1977) (en banc) (Arizona's mandatory pretrial "arbitration"
panel survived equal protection review); In re LiVolsi, 428 A.2d 1268 (N.J. 1981)
(compulsory arbitration of attorney-client fee disputes survived rational relationship
standard of equal protection review); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 424 N.E.2d 586
(Ohio 1981) (state had rational basis for statute establishing an arbitration board and
proceedings).
133. 344 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. 1984). For the constitutionality issue as considered
by Michigan's intermediate appellate courts, see Findlater & Ettelbrick, Contracts, 30
WAYNE L. REV. 421, 442-44 (1984).
134. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5041(1)-.5042(1) (West 1975). Statutes
that provide for voluntary arbitration but that mandate the composition of the arbitra-
tion panel are not uncommon. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-485(b) (1975); ALASKA STAT. §
09.55.535(0 (1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-117 (1982); Health Care Arbitration Act §
13, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 213 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
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statute provided for a panel composed of an attorney, a physician or
hospital administrator, and a third member who was neither. 3  The
plaintiffs argued that their procedural due process rights were infringed
by the probability of bias on the part of the medical provider panel
member. 136 For the majority there was insufficient evidence of bias:
[It has not been demonstrated that the medical members of these
panels have a direct pecuniary interest or that their decision may
have any substantial effect on the availability of insurance or insur-
ance premiums. We have been shown no grounds sufficient for us to
conclude that these decisionmakers will not act with honesty and in-
tegrity. We look for a pecuniary interest which creates a probability
of unfairness, a risk of actual bias which is too high to be constitu-
tionally tolerable. It has not been shown here.
We do not believe that the medical members of these panels are
so identified and aligned with- respondents in malpractice cases that
they may be expected to favor the respondents. Physicians and other
health professionals are trained in the medical arts and are oath-
bound to treat the ill. Hospital administrators are trained in the
proper functioning of hospitals. Neither physicians nor hospital ad-
ministrators have professional interests that are adverse to patients
or even malpractice claimants on a consistent, daily basis. Any iden-
tity of interest with respondents is not so strong as to create a sub-
liminal bias for one side and against the other.'37
Presume, however, that the due process challenge to such a statu-
tory provision had been accompanied by sufficient evidence of the risk
of bias. The result reached in Morris v. Metriyakool would probably
be unaffected. The presumed voluntary nature of malpractice arbitra-
tion would deflate the constitutional challenge here because due process
review presupposes "state action." According to the concurring opinion
of Justice Ryan, however, the state establishment and regulation of
§§ 2711.21(A)-.23(F) (Baldwin 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-25B-4, -10 to
-11, -13 to -15 (1979 & Su'pp. 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 7001-7002(a),(c)
(Supp. 1985).
135. MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5044(2) (West Supp. 1980).
136. Specifically, the concern involved the adjudicator's interest in the cost of
malpractice insurance. See Morris, 344 N.W.2d at 737. See generally Bedikian, supra
note 9, at 294-97; Mengel, The Constitutional and Contractual Challenges to Michi-
gan's Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act, 59 J. URB. L. 319, 331-35 (1982); Note,
The Michigan Malpractice Act's Requirement of a Physician on the Panel Violates
the Due Process Right to a Fair and Impartial Tribunal, 28 WAYNE L. REv. 1843
(1982).
137. Morris, 344 N.W.2d at 740-71. Compare that view with Justice Cavanagh's
dissent: "[The] situation thus presents too high a risk of actual bias on the part of the
medical-member decisionmakers to be constitutionally permissible." Id. at 761
(Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). See also Vincent v. Romagosa, 425 So.
2d 1237 (La. 1983) (upholding medical review panel against challenge of partiality).
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malpractice arbitration do not constitute such state action:
Here, the State of Michigan has not compelled the parties to arbi-
trate their disputes concerning medical malpractice, but has merely
announced the circumstances under which its courts will not inter-
fere with a private agreement to arbitrate medical malpractice dis-
putes. Indeed, the crux of plaintiffs' complaint is not that the state
has acted, but that the state has refused to act to prohibit private
agreements to arbitrate before a three-person panel, one of whom is
a doctor or a hospital administrator. The statutory refusal to act is
no different than an ordinary statute of limitations by which the
state declines to provide a civil trial remedy for medical malpractice
after the passage of a given period of time.138
Clearly, the importance of Justice Ryan's characterization of mal-
practice arbitration legislation is that it "cuts off at the pass" due pro-
cess review. The challenger is prevented from developing any evidence
of potential bias or other alleged defects1 39 in the state's arbitration
138. Morris, 344 N.W.2d at 753 (emphasis omitted). Again, contrast the
Cavanagh dissent:
[AlIthough there is no initial state action, i.e., the parties are not compelled
to execute an arbitration agreement, there is state action in the execution
itself and after execution, i.e., the state requires (1) certain terms to be in-
cluded in the agreement, and (2) specific procedures pursuant to the agree-
ment. Indeed, the enactment of a broad statutory scheme is an expression of
the public policy of the state and, to this extent, certainly constitutes "en-
couragement" of arbitration agreements by the state.
• . . Although the state can acquiesce in one's choice of a dispute reso-
lution mechanism, it cannot statutorily mandate procedures pursuant to the
mechanism selected which abridge constitutional rights. Consequently, it
should be concluded that, under federal constitutional law, these cases in-
volve state action.
Id. at 762-63 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court's view on "state action" may be gauged from Blum v. Yaret-
sky, 457 U.S. 991 (9182) (nursing home's receipt of Medicaid funding and state regu-
lation of nursing home do not convert nursing home's treatment of patients into "state
action"); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (privately operated school's re-
ceipt of state and federal funding did not render the school's personnel discharge deci-
sions acts of the state); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 822 (1982) (statutory
scheme for attachment subject to procedural due process requirements and invoked by
private party rendered that private party a "state actor").
Quaere has state facilitation of malpractice arbitration involved such significant
encouragement to health care providers that the choice to arbitrate must be seen as the
state's not merely the health care provider's? Does the replacement of malpractice liti-
gation with arbitration involve the exercise of traditionally state powers by a private
individual? See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-05.
139. An example of a defect would be the nonavailability of arbitrators to serve
as the panel. Cf. Vincent v. Romagosa, 425 So. 2d 1237 (La. 1983) (upholding pretrial
review panel in the face of a similar allegation).
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facilitating legislation.14 0 Equally clearly, judicial reluctance to deal
with alleged general panel bias at the constitutional level must be expli-
cable in part by the existence of another phase of judicial scrutiny (pe-
tition to set aside award) at which any particular arbitrator misconduct
could be examined. "1
The second type of challenge to arbitration statutes is based upon
the argument that they are impermissibly vague, thereby affronting a
claimant's reasonable expectations and hence his due process rights. In
other words, an individual claimant's difficulties in interpreting both
the scope of the facilitating statute and the scope of the arbitration
agreement may be combined to raise the more general issue of consti-
tutional validity.
Several difficulties may be encountered with this approach. Arbi-
tration enabling statutes are not norm producing, but are merely forum
directing.14 2 Moreover, poor draftsmanship does not by itself constitute
unconstitutional "vagueness. '" Finally, malpractice statutes, while
perhaps lacking clarity, do tend to use standard malpractice "terms of
art." They should, therefore, be amenable to state supreme court inter-
pretation, arguably lessening the need for their invalidation.
The third suggested approach to constitutional challenge of an ar-
bitration statute depends upon how the arbitration system operates in
practice in a given state. In 1978, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
upheld the constitutionality of that state's mandatory pretrial arbitra-
tion system in the face of challenges asserting the right to trial by jury,
the doctrine of separation of powers, and procedural due process."" In
1980, however, a challenger successfully attacked that same system in
140. This explains the collateral skirmish between Justices Ryan and Cavanagh
over the order in which the issues should be considered. See Morris, 344 N.W.2d at
747 n.2, 758 n.4.
141. See Good v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 199 Cal. Rptr. 581 (Ct. App. 1984);
Hartman v. Cooper, 474 A.2d 959 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984); King v. Retz, 454
N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1982); Menardi v. Petrigalla, 462 N.E.2d 1246 (Ohio Ct. App.
1983). See also Dinong v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. Rptr. 590 (Ct. App. 1981) (dis-
qualification of arbitrator on ground of impartiality not proper when arbitration agree-
ment contained no requirement of impartiality, but rather gave unqualified right to
party to nominate anyone as arbitrator).
Additionally, an unconscionability attack should not be ruled out in these arbitra-
tor situations. See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 176 (Cal. 1981) (en
banc) ("[I]f a party resisting arbitration can show that the rules under which arbitra-
tion is to proceed will operate to deprive him of what we in other contexts have termed
the common law right of fair procedure, the agreement to arbitrate should not be
enforced.").
142. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
143. Cf. Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364, 373 (5th Cir. 1984) (held that"a civil statute may require or proscribe conduct so vaguely that it violates due
process").
144. Parker v. Children's Hosp., 394 A.2d 932 (Pa. 1978).
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Mattos v. Thompson,14 5 asserting that it violated the litigant's constitu-
tional right to trial by jury. The court's acceptance of this new chal-
lenger's contentions was due primarily to the fact that by the time
Mattos was argued there was significant objective evidence which sug-
gested that the statutory system was totally incapable of keeping pace
with the volume of malpractice litigation that had been instituted. This
resulted in "oppressive delay and impermissibly infringe[d] upon the
constitutional right to a jury.' 4146
The successful use of this approach in the voluntary arbitration
context would undoubtedly require the development of statistical evi-
dence that, for example, the arbitration process was empirically incapa-
ble of dealing with submitted claims, or was clearly diminishing pro-
vider liability.14 7  In addition, this approach would also require
reconsideration of any prior judicial determination of the absence of"state action."
VII. UNCONSCIONABILITY AND ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
For the purposes of analysis, and notwithstanding the differing ju-
dicial conclusory language involved, it is suggested that use of the
terms "adhesion" and "unconscionability" connotes the following struc-
tured analysis. Presume that a court concludes that a provision in a
proferred contract (e.g., waiver of trial by jury) or a circumstance in
the negotiation phase (e.g., acceptance of the arbitration agreement as
a prerequisite to the provision of medical services) or a refusal to nego-
tiate (e.g., the compulsory use of a standardized form) is oppressive.
Depending upon the court's view of the severity of that oppression, two
judicial labels may be applied; the contract suffers from "substantive
unconscionability" or is considered to be a "contract of adhension." '4 8
The use of the former term implies a judicial determination to void the
contract, and further consideration of the contract's validity ceases be-
cause of the finding of substantive invalidity. Application of the latter
label marks the starting point for additional levels of judicial scrutiny.
145. 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980).
146. Id. at 196. For a post-Mattos defense of the system, see Lewis, Malpractice
Arbitration: Is Pennsylvania's System Dead or Alive?, LEGAL Asp. MED. PRAC., July
1981, at i.
147. Of course, the inherent difficulties of obtaining empirical data must be mea-
sured against the Mattos standard, which calls for the utilization of such data without
considering those problems. For an expression of this pragmatic view, see American
Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 683 P.2d 670, 684-87 (Cal. 1984) (en banc)
(Mosk, J., dissenting). To this might be added the notion that, even if such data were
collected, there will still be a fair probability of misinterpretation in whole or in part.
148. Obviously, matters are not quite as "neat" in practice. Thus, the "adhesion"
characterization will be a criterion in a determination of substantive unconscionability,




First, under a procedural unconscionability analysis, one should inquire
whether the terms and impact of the agreement have been sufficiently
disclosed to the party in the weaker bargaining position. If they have
been so disclosed, the inquiry then becomes whether the terms of the
agreement should be interpreted to favor the person in the weaker bar-
gaining position.1"9
At first glance, an agreement between a patient and a health care
provider to submit malpractice claims to arbitration is a contract of
adhesion1 50 and possibly unconscionable. 5 Such labeling is premature,
however, for it ignores the statutory foundation of the arbitration
agreements considered herein.1 52 A determination that an agreement
comes within the scope of a malpractice aribitration statute encourages
not only the conclusion that the claims arising are arbitrable as a mat-
ter of law, but also that the agreement is conscionable in substance.
Indeed, the California arbitration statute declares such an agreement
not to be unconscionable. 5
Some statutes go further and expressly condition conscionability
on the fulfillment of specific substantive and procedural criteria.' As a
149. See generally Wright, Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 33 ARBI-
TRATION J. 41 (1978). Clearly, these issues are for the court to address at the time it is
considering the motions to stay or compel arbitration. See also Note, Federal Preemp-
tion of Arbitration, 1984 J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 193:
The defense of unconscionability of the underlying contract has been held to
be an issue for the arbitrators. Similar issues arise with respect to the de-
fense of illegality of the underlying contract. If the claim is unconscionabil-
ity of the arbitration clause itself, the claim should be decided by the courts.
Id. at 202-03 (footnotes omitted).
150. But see CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1295 (West 1982) (statutory compliance
will per se negate any contractual adhesion). Cf. Victoria v. Superior Court, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 6 (Ct. App. 1985) (standard form contact proffered by provider exempt from
§ 1295 was not contract of adhesion, but did have "some adhesive characteristics").
151. For a very thorough analysis of unconscionability and its utility, see Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV, 495
(1967); see also Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE LJ. 757 (1969)
(discussion of the Leff analysis).
152. As has been stated in one opinion,
[a] finding of unconscionability generally reflects a determination that en-
forcement of a particular agreement is contrary to public policy. I agree
that enforcement of these agreements is bad policy. Nevertheless, in the last
analysis, determination of public policy is the province of the Legislature.
Where the Legislature has unambiguously endorsed a particular kind of
agreement, the judiciary is no longer free to declare that such agreements
are unconscionable. It seems to me that the Legislature has, wrongly or
rightly, given its unqualified seal of approval to these arbitration agree-
ments, and that I must therefore defer to its declaration of public policy.
Strong v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 325 N.W.2d 435, 439 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (Maher,
J., concurring).
153. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1295(e) (West 1982).
154. See infra text accompanying notes 164-206.
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complication, not all such statutory provisions apply with equal force to
both pretreatment and postclaim arbitration agreements. Furthermore,
different considerations may apply to the analysis of the conscionability
of agreements entered into as part of a group health plan in contrast to
individual patient-provider agreements.
Unconscionability issues' 5 furnish perhaps the finest illustration of
how arbitration agreements and medical malpractice claims make un-
easy bedfellows. Parties to commercial contracts and collective bargain-
ing agreements genuinely want interpretative disputes to be arbi-
trated.156  For them, the procedural speed and economy and
adjudicatory expertise traditionally associated with arbitration hold a
great attraction.157 The parties generally are in agreement about the
applicable substantive norms. 58 Within the context of their long-term
relationships and the overall purpose of their contracts, they have little
to lose and much to gain.' 59 Indeed, today's employee grievance upheld
will be tomorrow's grievance dismissed. 60 Yet for the medical malprac-
tice claimant there is "no tomorrow," and she has much to lose. 161
Of course, this thesis is disputable. According to the Supreme
Court of California,
[t]he speed and economy of arbitration, in contrast to the expense
and delay of jury trial, could prove helpful to all parties; the simpli-
fied procedures and relaxed rules of evidence in arbitration may aid
an injured plaintiff in presenting his case. Plaintiffs with less serious
injuries, who cannot afford the high litigation expenses of court or
155. See generally Bedikian, supra note 9, at 299-301; Henderson, supra note 2,
at 985-97; Mengel, supra note 136, at 327-31; Note, supra note 11, at 144-50. See also
Henderson, Alternatives to Litigation III. Contractual Problems in the Enforcement of
Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, in REPORT, supra note 2, at 321 app.
[hereinafter cited as Henderson, Alternatives].
156. See generally Mentschikoff, supra note 1, at 850-52.
157. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 7-8 nn.31-32.
158. Mentschikoff, supra note 1, at 868. See also Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
95, 130-32 (1974).
159. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 578 (1960). See also F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 1, at 1, 4-7.
160. "[T]he grievance procedure, including arbitration, is more than a method
for resolution of individual disputes-it is an integral 'part of the continuous collective
bargaining process.'" Kinyon & Rohlik, "Deflouring" Lucas Through Labored Char-
acterizations: Tort Actions of Unionized Employees, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 26 (1985)
(quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrier & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581
(1960)) (footnote omitted). See also St. Antoine, supra note 115, at 32. ("The arbitra-
tor's award is not so much an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement as
an organic extension, a fulfillment, a flowering of the seed it planted.").
161. To put it slightly differently, the malpractice plaintiff is a "one-shotter."
The parties to a collective bargaining agreement (and for that matter, the insurance
companies that stand behind medical malpractice defendants) are "repeat players."
See Galanter, supra note 158, at 97.
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jury trial, disproportionate to the amount of their claim, will benefit
especially from the simplicity and economy of arbitration; that pro-
cedure could facilitate the adjudication of minor malpractice claims
which cannot economically be resolved in a judicial forum. 162
The use of a small claims example, rather than the paradigmatic
malpractice case, clearly exposes this opinion as stemming from a judi-
cial predisposition toward malpractice arbitration. Further, can the
court's argument be refuted simply by referring to the number of chal-
lenges to submission (both to validity and arbitrability) brought by
claimants as opposed to those brought by providers? Can it be attacked
by pointing out the lengths to which some legislatures have gone in
mandating both revocability rights and formal patient disclosure?
Herein lie the greatest ironies. If the patient and the provider are
equally interested in arbitration, why should such consumer protection
be necessary? And if through such disclosure, either legislatively or ju-
dicially mandated, the consumer is provided with perfect information,
may that not make it extremely unlikely that any arbitration agree-
ments will be executed?
If the legislatures and courts permit providers to externalize some
or all of the information costs associated with the agreement-forming
process, can the system that remains truly be described as one of "vol-
untary" arbitration? The problem was well summarized by a California
appellate court which concluded that "notwithstanding the cogency of
the policy favoring arbitration and despite frequent judicial utterances
that because of that policy every intendment must be indulged in favor
of finding an agreement to arbitrate, the policy favoring arbitration
cannot displace the necessity for a voluntary agreement to
arbitrate." '163
A. Substantive Conscionability
Once it is accepted that there is considerable provider interest in
having malpractice claims arbitrated, the purely voluntary nature of
arbitration becomes jeopardized. There will be no "voluntary" agree-
ments when every provider in a given locale insists upon the inclusion
of an arbitration clause in its contracts for care and treatment. 6 4 Such
162. Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 131 Cal. Rptr. 882, 890 (1976). Cf.
Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 786 (Ct. App. 1976) ("The manifest
objective of a medical entity in including an arbitration clause is to avoid a jury trial
and thereby hopefully minimize losses for any medical malpractice and correspondingly
to hold down the amount of any recovery by the patient.").
163. Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rtpr. 775, 783 (Ct. App. 1976) (ci-
tation omitted).
164. Absent antitrust review, the patient will not be able to "bribe" providers
into permitting litigation. While a new entrant into the local market could achieve
differentiation by permitting litigation, the likelihood of adverse selection (i.e., of the
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a clause will likely be labelled as both "harsh" and a product of "non-
bargaining,"' 165 and the clause will probably attract judicial scrutiny of
its conscionability. 166
It is surprising that only five state statutes have addressed the is-
sue and expressly prohibited providers from making the execution of an
arbitration clause a prerequisite to the provision of health care.167 Of
these, the Illinois statute makes it clear that the purpose of malpractice
arbitration is limited to changing the style of, and forum for, dispute
resolution. Further contractual "modifications" to substantive'68 or pro-
cedural' 69 law are prohibited. Aside from its prophylactic effect, how-
ever, this is redundant. Any such limitation not authorized by statute
would be analyzed as akin to an exculpatory clause and therefore
voided. 7 °
Tatham v. Hoke'7 1 illustrates that a court will hold particularly
harsh terms substantively unconscionable despite the absence of such a
statutory provision. In Tatham, a federal district court, applying North
Carolina law, found that a $15,000 damage cap clause inserted into a
malpractice arbitration agreement was unenforceable as contrary to
public policy.
B. Procedural Conscionability
In this context, a conclusion of substantive unconscionability is the
product of a judicial determination that one party (the provider) to the
health care agreement has attempted to externalize excessively the le-
gal risks that flow from the performance of the treatment contract. As
has been demonstrated above, such provider attempts within the medi-
cal arbitration context have attracted both judicial and legislative dis-
newcomer attracting informed, litigious patients) makes this unlikely.
165. Spanagle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931,
948 (1969).
166. See, e.g., Obstetrics & Gynecologists Ltd. v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259 (Nev.
1985).
167. ALASKA STAT. § 09-55-535(a) (1983); Health Care Arbitration Act § 8(a),
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 208(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 600.5041(2), .5042(2) (1975); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2711.23(A) (Baldwin 1984);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-3 (1979).
An agreement that remains true to the voluntary nature of consensual arbitration
will not be stigmatized as substantively unconscionable. See, e.g., Morris v. Me-
triyakool, 344 N.W.2d 736, 742, 756-57 (Mich. 1983); Strong v. Oakwood Hosp.
Corp., 325 N.W.2d 435 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Jackson v. Detroit Memorial Hosp.,
312 N.W.2d 212, 214 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). This is particularly true if the agreement
also includes a revocability provision.
168. Health Care Arbitration Act § 8(c), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 208(c)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985).
169. Id. § 8(d), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 208(d).
170. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
171. 469 F. Supp. 914, 919 (W.D.N.C. 1979) (applying North Carolina law).
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favor. A conclusion of procedural unconscionability, on the other hand,
is the product of a judicial identification of excessive externalization of
information costs associated with the arbitration agreement's forma-




The statutory provisions that state legislatures have enacted to sat-
isfy procedural conscionability review of arbitration agreements effec-
tively illustrate the practical overlap between procedural and substan-
tive issues. Not only does legislation provide for the full and specific
disclosure of the ramifications of arbitration agreements, but in some
cases legislation also provides for the disclosure of statutorily mandated
provisions designed to avoid challenge on substantive unconscionability
grounds. For example, some statutes mandate "cooling-off" revocability
periods, and others provide that execution of the arbitration agreement
is not a prerequisite to the furnishing of health care. These statutes
generally enforce disclosure and dictate the manner in which the dis-





There are two basic models for the preexecution disclosure of in-
formation about the terms of the arbitration agreement. The first
model places the burden upon the health care provider to supply cer-
tain information to the patient. This burden will formally place a limi-
tation upon the extent to which the provider may externalize the preex-
ecution information costs, and therefore the legal risks, from the
provider to the patient..7 4 The second model conditions the agreement's
validity upon the patient's having received preexecution independent
advice. While this permits the provider to externalize preexecution in-
formation costs, it has the effect of replacing the patient's information
costs with actual patient expenditure incurred in obtaining independent
172. See generally Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L.
REv. 1, 25-26 (1969). In an effort to delineate the overlapping doctrines, one commen-
tator has referred to "procedural" unconscionability as "bargaining naughtiness," and
to "substantive" unconscionability as the "evils in the resulting contract." See Leff,
supra note 151, at 487.
173. See ALASKA STAT. § 09-55-535(b)-(c) (1983); Health Care Arbitration Act
§ 9(d), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 209(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 9-4235 (West 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5041(3),(5),
.5042(3)-(4) (West 1975); OHIO REv. CODE. ANN. §§ 2711.23(A)-(B), .24 (Baldwin
1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-3 (1979); VA. CODE § 8.01.581.12 (1984).
See also CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1295 (West 1982) (statutory compliance satisfies
"validity" question).
174. Michigan's empirical study of patients and provider comprehension of mal-
practice arbitration is summarized in Mengel, supra note 136, at 335-37.
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advice.' 75 The former system of provider-disclosure has been the more
popular in the drafting of today's medical malpractice arbitration stat-
utes. Of the seven jurisdictions that have adopted this model, six are
more or less specific about both the content and form of the agree-
ment.176 The regulation of form extends to both the conspicuousness of
certain provisions within the arbitration agreement 177 and the conspicu-
ousness of the arbitration agreement in, relation to any other agree-
ments entered into between the patient and the provider . 78 Further,
Michigan mandates the delivery to the patient of an explanatory infor-
mation brochure,19 and Illinois provides for duplicative disclosure upon
discharge. 80 In contrast, the Alaska statute, while it does mandate the
content and form of the agreement to an extent, places the further re-
sponsibility for comprehensive regulation upon the attorney general.' 8'
Two important legal issues, considered below, 182 arise from this
provider-disclosure model. First, to what extent does provider compli-
ance with statutory regulation of disclosure curtail judicial review of
the agreement's procedural conscionability? Second, in jurisdictions
where no such statutory regulation exists, to what extent will provider
disclosure be mandated by the courts?
The second disclosure model, which calls for the rendering of inde-
pendent preexecution advice to the patient, raises a different set of
problems. As has been noted, "[a]lmost every written commercial
transaction, except one hammered out by two lawyers representing two
175. The patient still incurs some (albeit lesser) information costs: for example,
the costs in finding, "What type of lawyer should I go to for advice? Who is the best
lawyer in town to so advise me?"
176. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1295(a)-(b) (West 1982); Health Care Arbi-
tration Act §§ 8(b),(e), 9(a)-(b),(d)-(e), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, §§ 208(b),(e),
209(a)-(b),(d)-(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-4231,
-4235(1)-(2) (West 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5041(2)-(3), (5)-(6),
.5042(2)-(4), (7) (West 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2711.23 (A)-(E), (J) (Baldwin
1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-3 (1979).
177. The most extensively regulated form is found in the Illinois statute. See
Health Care Arbitration Act § 9, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 209 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1985).
178. While it is quite possible that the parties will enter into simultaneous agree-
ments, some statutes provide that the arbitration agreement must be separate from any
other document. See, e.g., Health Care Arbitration Act § 8(b), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10,
§ 208(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.23(G) (Baldwin
1984). For an example of how a provider could put together a composite document, see
Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 779 n.2 (Ct. App. 1976).
179. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5041(6) (physicians), .5042(7) (hospitals)
(West 1975).
180. Health Care Arbitration Act § 8(e), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 208(e)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985).
181. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(b) (1983). Note that this provision only applies
to pretreatment agreements.
182. See infra text accompanying notes 191-206.
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individuals of equal bargaining power, is in a broad sense, a contract of
adhesion."' 183 The Georgia legislature has reacted by providing that "no
agreement to arbitrate shall be enforceable unless the agreement was
made subsequent to the alleged malpractice and after a dispute or con-
troversy has occurred and unless the claimant is represented by an at-
torney-at-law at the time the agreement is entered into.' 8 4 Not only
does this statute go farther in assuring procedural conscionability than
any court would, 85 but inevitably it leads to speculation about whether
any attorney would advise his client to execute a medical malpractice
arbitration agreement.
The legal ramifications are serious. First, the patient-client may
try to disavow an agreement to arbitrate entered into between her at-
torney (purporting to act as her agent) and the provider.'86 Second, if
the patient-client herself executes the agreement upon legal advice,
there may arise the potential for legal malpractice litigation. It is un-
likely that the courts would adopt a per se negligence rule to reflect a
conclusion that it is always against the client-patient's interests to ad-
vise arbitration rather than litigation of a claim. Yet litigation would
be invited in circumstances involving, for example, one-sided arbitra-
tion agreements 87 or very good jury cases. 188 Even if a court concluded
that there was no legal malpractice in the substance of the proffered
advice, the plaintiff-patient might be able to construct an informed con-
sent malpractice claim. 8 9 After all, "[an attorney should explain to
the client the strategic considerations that determine whether a jury
trial or some other form of dispute resolution should be utilized."' 90
Thus, the attorney may be liable, not for negligently given advice, but
for negligently failing to inform his client of the ramifications of that
advice.
183. Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 797 (Ct. App. 1976)
(Gardner, J., dissenting).
184. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-403 (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added). Note also Texas'
general arbitration statute, which has a similar provision with regard to the arbitration
of all personal injury claims. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 224(c) (Vernon 1973).
SEE ALSO N.C.R. Corp. v. Mr. Penguin Tuxedo Rental & Sales, 663 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1983).
185. See, e.g., Guadano v. Long Island Plastic Surgical Group, 607 F. Supp.
136, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
186. See infra text accompanying notes 297-99.
187. See, e.g., the "agreement" executed in Blanton v. Womancare Inc., 696
P.2d 645, 647 (Cal. 1985) (en banc).
188. For example, a case with a visibly disabled plaintiff or with deposition testi-
mony suggesting "modifications" made to patient records would have jury appeal.
189. See generally Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 307 (1979); Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed
Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979).
190. Blanton v. Womancare Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 656 (Cal. 1985) (en banc)
(Bird, C.J., concurring).
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Given the various legislative attempts to provide the patient with
information before the execution of an arbitration agreement, the first
question for consideration is the effect that provider compliance with
that legislative mandate will have on the agreement. The answer ap-
pears to be that so long as there is strict compliance, the agreement
will be considered procedurally conscionable, 191 and additional infor-
mation need not be disclosed by the provider. 93
Three additional points should be stressed. First, judicial insistence
upon strict compliance with statutory provisions will overcome the pol-
icy of attempting to construe arbitration agreements in favor of arbitra-
tion. 93 Second, the judicially espoused rule of strict compliance will
effectively mandate a hearing on the issue whenever raised by the pa-
tient-plaintiff.1'9
Third, strict compliance with the statutory regime will not neces-
sarily foreclose review of the circumstances surrounding such compli-
ance. Of course, that begs the question-what circumstances will pro-
vide grounds for nonenforcement of the arbitration agreement? Courts
seem quite happy to recite that any arbitration agreement must have
been entered into "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily."19 5
Granted, they will entertain case-by-case review of accusations of coer-
191. See, e.g., Rosenfield v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. Rptr. 611, 613-14 (Ct.
App. 1983); Roberts v. McNamara-Warren Community Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 279, 281
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Ewald v. Pontiac Gen. Hosp., 329 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982); Horn v. Cooke, 325 N.W.2d 558, 562 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Rome v.
Sinai Hosp., 316 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). Cf Moore v. Fragatos, 321
N.W.2d 781, 789-90 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (record must affirmatively show that
plaintiff was aware he was signing arbitration agreement).
192. For example, it will be unnecessary for the provider to inform the patient
about the relative merits of arbitration. See, e.g., Morris v. Metriyakool, 344 N.W.2d
736, 757 (Mich. 1984); Brown v. Siang, 309 N.W.2d 575, 581 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
193. Ewald v. Pontiac Gen. Hosp., 329 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
Cf Kukowski v. Piskin, 297 N.W.2d 612, 613 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), affd, 327
N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 1982) ("Arbitration clauses are to be liberally construed, With all
doubts about the arbitralility of an issue resolved in favor of arbitration.") (citation
omitted).
194. May v. St. Luke's Hosp., 363 N.W.2d 6 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). See also,
Rome v. Sinai Hosp., 316 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Pipper v. DiMusto,
279 N.W.2d 542 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979). With regard to the burden of proof in such
circumstances, see Moore v. Fragatos, 321 N.W.2d 781 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). Cf
Manuel v. Pierce, 328 N.W.2d 633, 634-35 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (Danhof, C.J., stat-
ing in dissent that the burden of proof on the validity of the agreement does not neces-
sarily rest with the defendant). Of course, there may be no need for a hearing if there
is uncontroverted or objective evidence of noncompliance. See Rosenfield v. Superior
Court, 191 Cal. Rptr. 611 (Ct. App. 1983); Roberts v. McNamara-Warren Commu-
nity Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 279 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Ewald v. Pontiac Gen. Hosp., 329
N.W.2d 495 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
195. See, e.g., Roberts v. McNamara-Warren Community Hosp., 360 N.W.2d
279, 281 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). See also Ford v. Shearson Lehman/American Ex-
press Inc., 225 Cal. Rptr. 895, 904-05 (Ct. App. 1986).
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cion,196 misrepresentation, 197 or mistake. 98 Courts seem less willing,
however, to entertain arguments of plaintiff-patient illiteracy. 99 To
complicate matters further, a patient's allegation that she signed the
agreement while in considerable pain may be reviewed either under the
general principles of procedural conscionability described above, 00 or
on the basis of an explicit statutory provision that effectively removes
an "emergency patient" 20 ' from the scope of statutory arbitrability.20
Clearly, different issues arise in jurisdictions that do not mandate
preexecution disclosure. For example, the Supreme Court of Nevada
refused to enforce an arbitration agreement in which the provider of-
fered to answer questions the patient may have had with regard to the
agreement, but did not disclose to her its terms and effect.203 A similar
result was reached by a California appellate court in Wheeler v. St.
Joseph Hospital.2 4 That case involved an arbitration clause in a hospi-
tal admission/consent form. The clause did not condition treatment
upon agreeing to arbitration, and it did provide for revocation. Never-
theless, the court characterized the contract as one of adhesion,205
stating:
196. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. Rptr. 223 (Ct. App. 1980);
McKinstry v. Valley Obstetrics-Gynecology Clinic, 327 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982); Capman v. Harper-Grace Hosp., 294 N.W.2d 205 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
197. See, e.g., Horn v. Cooke, 325 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
198. See, e.g., Guadano v. Long Island Plastic Surgical Group, 607 F. Supp. 136
(E.D.N.Y. 1982).
199. See, e.g., Horn v. Cooke, 325 N.W.2d 558, 561-62 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
Cf. Aluia v. Harrison Community Hosp., 362 N.W.2d 783 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)
(genuine issue of material fact existed whether Italian-speaking patient had made
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of right to jury trial); Ramirez v. Superior
Court, 163 Cal. Rptr. 223, 227-28 (Ct. App. 1980) ("adhesion contract" exception to
"duty to read" requirement applied in favor of Spanish-speaking patient).
Consider also the burden of proof applicable to such cases as provided for by OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.24 (Baldwin 1984) (preponderance of the evidence needed to
rebut presumption of validity).
This reluctance may be attributed to the duty to read imposed by general contract
law. See Guadano v. Long Island Plastic Surgical Group, 607 F. Supp. 136, 139
(E.D.N.Y. 1982). See also J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 9-
41 to 9-46 (2d ed. 1977).
200. For an additional example, see Moore v. Fragatos, 321 N.W.2d 781, 790
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
201. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5042(1) (West 1975).
202. See, e.g., May v. St. Luke's Hosp., 363 N.W.2d 6 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984);
Pipper v. DiMusto, 279 N.W.2d 542, 544 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
203. Obstetrics & Gynecologists Ltd. v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259, 1261 (Nev.
1985).
204. 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Ct. App. 1976).
205. See id. at 785. The agreement in question was executed prior to CAL. Civ.
PRO. CODE § 1295 (West 1982). California now follows the "strict compliance" ap-
proach. See Rosenfield v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. Rptr. 611, 613-14 (Ct. App. 1983).
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We conclude that in order to be binding, an arbitration clause incor-
porated in a hospital's "CONDITIONS OF ADMISSION" form
should be called to the patient's attention and he should be given a
reasonable explanation of its meaning and effect, including an expla-
nation of any options available to the patient." 6
2. Group Health Plans and Conscionability
In characterizing the arbitration clause in Wheeler as adhesive,
the majority of the court distinguished2 0 7 a contrary finding in Madden
v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,20 8 on the basis that Madden had in-
volved a group health plan. The subsequent California statute has con-
firmed the apparently distinctive nature of group plans by excusing
them from compliance with otherwise mandated disclosure, form of dis-
closure, and revocability provisions." 9 The courts have developed this
distinction further by apparently changing the rules of the agency
"game" to reflect their view of the reality of group health plan
negotiation. 10
Madden expresses the apparent rationale for this different treat-
ment of group health plans:
In the characteristic adhesion contract case, the stronger party
drafts the contract, and the weaker has no opportunity, either per-
sonally or through an agent, to negotiate concerning its terms.
The [group] plan, on the other hand, represents the product of
negotiation between two parties, [the provider] and [the employer],
possessing parity of bargaining strength. Although plaintiff did not
engage in the personal negotiation of the contract's terms, she and
other ... employees benefitted from representation by [an employer-
group], composed in part of persons elected by the affected employ-
ees, which exerted its bargaining strength to secure medical protec-
tion for employees on more favorable terms than any employee could
206. Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 786. Note how a different result may obtain if
these issues are raised at the post-award stage. See Lamb v. Holy Cross Hosp., 148
Cal. Rptr. 273 (Ct. App. 1978).
207. Indeed, the majority emasculated Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552
P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976) (en banc), at least according to the Wheeler dissent. 133 Cal.
Rptr. at 795 (Gardner, P.J., dissenting). See Davis v. Blue Cross, 600 P.2d 1060, 1061
n.1 (Cal. 1979) (en banc).
208. 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
209. CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 1295(f) (West 1982) (excusing group plans from
§ 1295(a)-(c)). See also Dinong v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. Rptr. 606 (Ct. App.
1980) (holding, inter alia, that (1) this provision of the California statute did not vio-
late equal protection guarantees by distinguishing between individuals and group plan
enrollees with regard to preagreement disclosure; and (2) technical nonqualification of
a group health provider during a state administrative reorganization was not sufficient
to place the provider outside of the exemption of § 1295(f)).




Of course, this conjures up an unrealistic picture of two parties,
each with perfect information, hammering out a contract to the benefit
of the employee-patient. It falsely presumes that the interests of the
employer are identical and co-extensive with those of the employee. In
reality, the employer is willing to trade the employee's litigation rights
for lower employer-incurred costs.
In any event, both Madden and the California statute deal with
the disclosure of the arbitration clause. A problem may also arise with
regard to a group provider making arbitration a prerequisite to the pro-
vision of health care (i.e., refusing to negotiate the issue of arbitration).
In South Dakota, a jurisdiction that prohibits such a provider stance, 12
a health maintenance organization argued that the insertion of a
mandatory arbitration clause in its enrollee contracts was a prerequisite
to enrollment rather than to the provision of health care, a position
that the South Dakota attorney general not surprisingly refused to
accept.213
VIII. REVOCABILITY ISSUES
At common law, a party to an arbitration agreement could revoke
her submission to arbitrate prior to the making of an award.2 14 The
other party could then pursue an orthodox breach of contract action.2 15
In contrast, the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1955211 provides that an
arbitration agreement "is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract. ' 2 17 Similar language has been expressly adopted in five medical
malpractice statutes. 18 In this context, "revocation" seems more akin
211. Madden, 552 P.2d at 1185 (citations omitted). Cf. Victoria v. Superior
Court, 222 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1985) (avoiding the Madden approach by holding that
"unlike Madden, it is not clear from the record whether petitioner's father had an
opportunity to select an alternative health care plan which did not require
arbitration").
212. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-3 (1979). For the other states, see
supra note 167.
213. 1975-76 Op. Att'y Gen. S.D. 667, 670 (No. 76-98).
214. See, e.g., Lerma v. Allstate Ins. Co., 301 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ind. 1968). See
generally G. WILNER, supra note 1, § 3.01. See also cases cited at UNIF. ARBITRATION
ACT § I n.2, 7 U.L.A. 1, 4 (Supp. 1985).
215. See, e.g., Brown v, Eubank, 443 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). Cf
Nassau Ins. Co. v. McMorris, 363 N.E.2d 700, 701 (N.Y. 1977) ("[Q]uestions as to
whether the agreement has been terminated ... have customarily been held to be for
the arbitrator.").
216. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1, 7 U.L.A. 4 (1978).
217. Id., 7 U.L.A. at 4.
218. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-485(a) (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-4232 (West
1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.22 (Baldwin 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
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to "rescission," in which case the grounds for rescission would be lim-
ited to traditional contractual ones such as fraud, duress, mistake, and
unconscionability.219
Additionally, seven malpractice arbitration statutes contain very
specific provisions permitting a patient to "revoke" the agreement
within a certain time frame.22 ° Conceptually more closely related to the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code's 21 right of cancellation,222 these
types of provisions provide the patient with a "cooling-off" period in
which to reconsider her agreement to arbitrate. Current statutes usu-
ally provide a period of thirty or sixty days in duration. There is consid-
erable variation in the time from which this period begins to run; it
may run from the execution of the agreement,2 3 discharge from the
hospital,2 termination of care,225 or termination of the physician-pa-
tient relationship.2 6 Some statutes toll the revocation period in the case
of continuing ill health2 27 or incapacity of the patient.2 8 While written
notice of exercise of the right of revocation is expressly demanded in
most of the revocation provisions, those that are silent on this issue do
not expressly prohibit the health care provider from including this for-
mality as a condition. 2 9 The Ohio statute is unique in providing that
the filing of a medical malpractice claim within the cooling-off period
21-25A-1 (1979) (applicable to medical malpractice arbitration through § 21-25B-1);
VA. CODE § 8.01-577(B) (1984) (applicable to medical malpractice arbitration through
§ 8.01-581.12.A).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 148-73.
220. ALASKA STAT. § 09-55-535(c) (1983); CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1295(c)
(West 1982); Health Care Arbitration Act § 9(c), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 209(c)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-4233 (West 1983); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. §§ 600.5041(3), .5042(3) (West 1975); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2711.23(B)
(Baldwin 1984); VA. CODE § 8.01-577(B) (1984). See also S.D. COFIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 21-25B-1 (1979), which, while not permitting revocation, does allow the arbitration
contract for future services to be terminated.
221. UNIF, CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.502, 7 U.L.A. 384-85 (1978). See also
Rosenfield v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. Rptr. 611, 614 (Ct. App. 1983).
222. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.502, 7 U.L.A. 384-85 (1978).
223. ALASKA STAT. § 09-55-535(c) (1983); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1295(c)
(West 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-4233 (West 1983); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. §
600.5041(3) (West 1975).
224. Health Care Arbitration Act § 9(C), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 209(c)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600. 5042(3) (West 1975);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.23(B), (I) (Baldwin 1984).
225. VA. CODE § 8.01-581.12.A (1984).
226. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.23(B) (Baldwin 1984).
227. ALASKA STAT. § 09-55-535(c) (1983).
228. VA. CODE § 8.01.581.12 (1984). In this instance, the period runs from the
date of appointment of a legal representative.
229. See, e.g., Health Care Arbitration Act § 9(c), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, §
209(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (any signatory may cancel); VA. CODE § 8.01.581.12
(1984) (valid if withdrawal is allowed).
[Vol. 30:571
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION
automatically revokes the arbitration agreement. 3 Only the Louisiana
statute addresses the potentially troublesome problem of the alleged
malpractice occurring within the cooling-off period, and it provides that
the revocation is effective only with regard to subsequent claims.213
Several difficult problems remain for consideration. First, in the
case of malpractice arbitration statutes that are silent on the issue of
revocability, 282 are patients permitted to withdraw ("revoke") their
consent? One possible option would be for a court to remain true to the
voluntary nature of alternative dispute resolution and permit revoca-
tion, with reasonable notice,233 up to the submission of the claim to the
arbitrators."s
A second problem will arise when a patient dies or becomes inca-
pacitated during the revocation period. While some statutes provide
specifically that the revocation right in such a case passes to the pa-
tient's legal representative," 5 only the Illinois and Virginia statutes ex-
pressly toll the revocation period until the representative is ap-
pointed .23  To deal with such legislative lacunae, the Michigan courts
have been forced to introduce tolling provisions in situations involving a
patient's incapacity 37 or death.238
230. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.23(I) (Baldwin 1984).
231. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-4233 (West 1983). In addition to such revocation
provisions, some statutes provide for the automatic lapse of the agreement after either
a certain period or a given contingency. For examples of the automatic time lapse, see
Health Care Arbitration Act § 9(c), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 209(c) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-4236 (West 1983); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §
600.5041(4) (1975). See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5042(6) (West 1975)
(contingency lapse upon fresh admission to hospital).
232. See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-110 to -133 (1981). Consider, however,
that this Georgia statute allows medical malpractice arbitration only of existing contro-
versies and only if the claimant is represented by counsel. Query, then, whether a revo-
cation provision is necessary. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-112 (1981).
233. See, e.g., City of Beverly v. White, Hamele & Assocs., 580 P.2d 1321 (Kan.
1978) (common-law agreement revocable); Marsello v. Barnett, 236 A.2d 869, 874
(N.J. 1967) ("[A plaintiff is] bound to give reasonably early notice of his intention to
withdraw .... Where such notice is unreasonably delayed, the other party would be
entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred.").
234. See, e.g., Grove v. Seltzer, 266 A.2d 301 (N.J. 1970). See also Marsello v.
Barnett, 236 A.2d 869, 874 (N.J. 1967).
235. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.23(B) (Baldwin 1984); MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 600.5041(3), .5042(3) (West 1975).
236. Health Care Arbitration Act § 9(c), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 209(c)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.12.A (1984). Alaska has a physical
incapacity tolling provision. See ALASKA STAT. § 09-55-535(c) (1983). The Louisiana
statute circumvents the problem by prohibiting revocation if the act of malpractice has
already occurred. If one presumes that the act of malpractice will have occurred prior
to the patient's death, there will be no revocation right to be passed on to a representa-
tive, let alone to be tolled. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4233 (West 1983).
237. Amwake v. Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 285 N.W.2d 369, 372-73 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1979) (comatose patient given 60 days from the time her disability was removed
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Further, in Edwards v. St. Mary's Hospital,23 in which the hus-
band of a comatose patient purported to revoke his wife's arbitration
agreement with the defendant before being appointed administrator of
her estate, the appellate court refused an overly technical reading of
the Michigan revocability provision. Instead, the court held that "[it
appears natural to include a husband within the term 'legal representa-
tive' when his wife is comatose. Under normal circumstances the hus-
band will look out for his wife's business and best interests. ' 40
In addition to these technical considerations, there arises a far
more important conceptual, and yet practical, problem. Presume that a
patient executed an arbitration agreement upon admission to a hospital
and that the patient read and understood the arbitration clause. Why
would the patient want to revoke that agreement within thirty days?
Why would the patient even think about the arbitration agreement
within the next thirty days? In the context of, say, a consumer credit
application, the effect of the signature becomes obvious to the con-
sumer almost immediately. The proximity of that first payment concen-
trates the consumer's mind on the advisability of the credit purchase.
For the patient, however, the only tangible reminder of the existence of
the arbitration agreement will be when she brings a malpractice claim,
an event unlikely to occur within the brief revocation period. Is it safe
to say that it is this factor which explains the low patient use of
revocation? 241
IX. SCOPE OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION STATUTE
A legislative body that simply establishes an arbitration scheme
for "persons asserting a claim based on medical malpractice ' 24 2 pays
to revoke the arbitration agreements).
238. Boiko v. Henry Ford Hosp., 313 N.W.2d 344, 346-47 (Mich. Ct. App.
1981) (legal representative has 60 days from date of appointment to revoke decedent's
previously signed arbitration agreement); DiPonio v. Henry Ford Hosp., 311 N.W.2d
754, 757-58 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (coadministrators had 60 days from first notice of
arbitration agreement to expiration of revocation period).
In general, it appears that, since a failure to revoke an arbitration agreement does
not have the effect of barring the plaintiff's action, the judiciary will not be favorably
disposed towards applying any "discovery" rule from which the revocation period
would run. See Capman v. Harper-Grace Hosp., 294 N.W.2d 205, 208 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1980). Similarly, the judiciary will be hesitant to introduce other tolling provi-
sions, such as one for the fraudulent concealment of the existence of a cause of action.
See, e.g., Swope v. Printz, 468 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. 1971).
239. 356 N.W.2d 255 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
240. Id. at 257.
241. See Ludlam & Hassard, Arbitration, HOSPITAL, Oct. 1, 1970, at 58, 81
(discussion of a study indicating that less than one-tenth of one percent of admitted
patients reject offered arbitration contracts or provisions).
242. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002 (Supp. 1985).
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scant regard to the legal ingenuity of the malpractice bar. Even if the
courts recognize a "strong public policy . . . favoring arbitration '243
and construe agreements to favor arbitration2 44 difficult problems of
interpretation arise. For example, it may be difficult to identify the par-
ties intended by legislatures to be permitted to use the prescribed
schemes, and there may be problems in defining the types of conduct
and claims to be considered arbitrable.
In general terms, the scope of an arbitration agreement-and thus,
the parties and type of conduct included-is a matter for the arbitra-
tors.24 6 After all, the arbitrator will determine the intention of the par-
ties regarding the breadth of the submission to arbitration. This is not
true, however, with regard to questions relating to arbitrability as a
matter of law or to the scope of arbitration facilitating statutes.2 6 Just
as a claimant may resist arbitration on the basis of a judicial determi-
nation of substantive or procedural unconscionability,2 47 so may she re-
sist because the agreement falls outside the scope of the statutory arbi-
tration provision.2' 8 As one court stated with regard to the former
scenario, "[c]ompulsory submission to arbitration cannot precede a ju-
dicial determination of the validity of the agreement itself.12 49 Indeed,
once the patient has raised the issue of noncompliance, a provider is
243. Beynon v. Garden Grove Medical Group, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146, 149 (Ct. App.
1980). See also Menardi v. Petrigalla, 462 N.E.2d 1246, 1249 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
244. See, e.g., Kukowski v. Piskin, 297 N.W.2d 612, 613 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980),
affid, 327 N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 1982) ("Arbitration clauses are to be liberally con-
strued, with all doubts about the arbitrability of an issue resolved in favor of
arbitration.").
245. But see GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-112 (1981) (scope of agreement is for judge
to determine).
246. See generally Henderson, supra note 2, at 971-76; Henderson, Alternatives,
supra note 155, at 329-31. See also Bel Pre Medical Center v. Frederick Contractors,
Inc., 320 A.2d 558 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974) (arbitrator decides procedural issues of
claim), rev'd, 334 A.2d 526 (Md. 1975) (procedural timeliness of submission to arbi-
tration is question for judge, not arbitrator); AT&T Technologies v. Communications
Workers of Am., No. 84-1913, slip op., 54 USLW 4339, 4341.
It is the court's duty to interpret the agreement and to determine
whether the parties intended to arbitrate grievances concerning layoffs pred-
icated on a "lack of work" determination by the Company. If the court
determines that the agreement so provides, then it is for the arbitrator to
determine the relative merits of the parties' substantive interpretations of
the agreement. It was for the court, not the arbitrator, to decide in the first
instance whether the dispute was to be resolved through arbitration.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 148-73.
248. Cf. Herrera v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. Rptr. 553 (Ct. App. 1984) (statu-
tory language sets threshold of arbitrable actions and does not limit disputes to the
constraints of that language). A later decision by this California appellate court seems
both to agree with and to contradict the Herrara opinion. See Baker v. Sadick, 208
Cal. Rptr. 676 (Ct. App. 1984).
249. Capman v. Harper-Grace Hosp., 294 N.W.2d 205, 207 (Mich. Ct. App.
1980).
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"required to establish that an arbitration agreement was knowingly, in-
telligently, and voluntarily entered into by the plaintiff in strict compli-
ance with the malpractice arbitration act."2 50
It should be noted that there are some "scope of agreement" issues
that do not involve such difficult legal problems. For example, in Troy
v. Leep,2 51 a patient executed an arbitration agreement applying to
claims arising out of her hospital treatment. The court remanded the
cause for trial and did not compel arbitration, since the plaintiffs' peti-
tion alleged provider negligence which had in fact preceded the pa-
tient's hospitalization.5
A. Defendants
Some arbitration statutes make use of the superficially all-inclu-
sive phrase "health care provider,"2 53 and some make use of a referen-
tial definition by way of unrelated state provisions such as licensure
statutes.2 54 Still other statutes provide exhaustive lists of potential de-
fendants who may take advantage of the arbitration option.2 55 Thus,
the statutory draftsmen have not always dealt adequately with the in-
clusion or exclusion of, for example, pharmacists, dentists, health main-
250. Roberts v. McNamara-Warren Community Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 279, 281
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984). In addition to those issues identified in the arbitration statutes
themselves, some problems pertaining to scope have been litigated in the context of
mandatory medical malpractice review panels. Although it might be thought that
stricter, narrower construction would be employed by a court interpreting such nonelec-
tive schemes, in practice this does not seem to follow. The courts of a jurisdiction that
have upheld such a review panel against constitutional challenge are generally favora-
bly disposed towards wide use of review panels.
251. 300 N.W.2d 598 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). See also Miller v. Swanson, 289
N.W.2d 875 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). There will be transitional "timing" problems as
well, depending upon the effective date of the applicable statute. See, e.g., Oxtoby v.
McGowan, 447 A.2d 860 (Md. 1982) (actions for medical injuries occurring before the
effective date of the statute are not subject to it).
252. Troy, 300 N.W.2d at 599.
253. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09-55-535(a) (1983).
254. E.g., CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 1295 (g)(1) (West 1982). See also LaCroix v.
Caron, 423 A.2d 247 (Me. 1980) (held that podiatrists are not physicians within a
licensure act referentially included into the malpractice notification provisions).
255. Examine, for example, the Virginia statute:
"Health care provider" means a person, corporation, facility or institution
licensed by this Commonwealth to provide health care or professional ser-
vices as a physician or hospital, dentist, pharmacist, registered or licensed
practical nurse, optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor, physical therapist,
physical therapy assistant, clinical psychologist or a nursing home . . . ex-
cept those nursing institutions conducted by and for those who rely upon
treatment by spiritual means alone through prayer in accordance with a rec-
ognized church or religious denomination, or an officer, employee or agent
thereof acting in the course and scope of his employment.
VA. CODE § 8.01-581.1 (1984)
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tenance organizations,25 nursing homes, and the manufacturers and
suppliers of drugs and surgical equipment.
It may be argued that the purpose of existing malpractice arbitra-
tion statutes is to deal with claims that involve the care and treatment
arising directly out of a provider-patient relationship. Thus, a claim
brought against a physician-author of a diet book would fall outside
that statutory purpose. "9' A court would undoubtedly find, however,
that an allegation of improper treatment and care rendered by an am-
bulance service, other than negligent driving, " ' would come within the
arbitration statute, as would a misdiagnosis by an independent medical
laboratory. 59
Aside from such threshold questions of whether an arbitration
agreement may extend as a matter of law to a particular defendant,
problems of interpreting the scope of agreements will arise in the iden-
tification of specific defendants included in the agreement to arbi-
trate. 60 Consider, for example, the interpretation of an agreement to
arbitrate entered into between a patient and a hospital which expressly
provided that its scope extended to claims against independent staff
doctors. The Michigan courts have decided that a binding agreement to
arbitrate exists between the independent staff doctor and the patient in
such a case,261 provided that there is evidence that the doctor in ques-
tion executed an agreement to arbitrate with the hospital before the
execution of the hospital-patient agreement. 62
B. Counterclaims, Joinder, Contribution, and Indemnity
Counterclaims pose two obvious problems. First, consider the situ-
ation in which a hospital brings an action against a discharged patient
for her unpaid bill. The defendant replies that the unpaid fees were the
result of her extended hospitalization, which was itself caused by the
256. See, e.g., Group Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 453 A.2d 1198, 1202-03 (Md.
1983) (court interpreted arbitration statute not to cover health maintenance
organizations).
257. Smith v. Linn, 414 A.2d 1106 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980).
258. Sigmon v. County of Tompkins, 449 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
259. Calvin v. Schlossman, 427 N.Y.S.2d 632 (App. Div. 1980).
260. Some of these problems may be circumvented at the legislative level by
mandating the form of the arbitration agreement. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09-55-
535(b) (1983) (requires prior approval of the agreement's form by the attorney
general).
261. Kukowski v. Piskin, 297 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), aff'd, 327
N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 1982).
262. Belobradich v. Sarnsethsiri, 346 N.W.2d 83 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (hospi-
tal-physician arbitration agreement executed several months after hospital-patient
agreement). This can be contrasted with the issues arising in a mandatory arbitration
involving a respondeat superior suit. See, e.g., Group Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 453
A.2d 1198 (Md. 1983).
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plaintiff's malpractice. If the defendant's reply is considered a counter-
claim rather than a defense, it is a "claim" and, arguably, should be
submitted to arbitration. 63 Consider the converse situation, in which
the patient submits her malpractice claim to arbitration and the de-
fendant hospital counterclaims for an unpaid bill"' or for the loss of
reputation and business.2 65 If the scope of the arbitration agreement is
phrased in terms of "any controversy arising out of claims based on
negligence or medical malpractice,"'2 6 the issue is far from clear. The
counterclaim may be a "controversy" arising out of the malpractice"claim," but it is not a "claim" based on malpractice or negligence.
Furthermore, being a contractual claim, it may be outside the compe-
tence of a specialized arbitration panel comprised, at least in part, of
physicians or personal injury attorneys.
In any event, it is clear that counterclaim situations involve only
the existing parties to the arbitration agreement. As the parties prolif-
erate, however, so exponentially do the problems. The case of Staub v.
Southwest Butler County School District," 7 decided with reference to
Pennsylvania's then extant mandatory arbitration/mediation scheme,
concerned a personal injury suit brought by a high school student fol-
lowing a fall. The defendant school district joined the health care prov-
iders who had treated the plaintiff following her fall. The health care
providers objected on the basis that the arbitration panel had exclusive
original jurisdiction over malpractice claims against them. Since the
plaintiff had not filed a claim against the health care providers and the
defendant third party plaintiff was entitled to seek contribution from
them, the court permitted joinder." 8 As was pointed out in the
concurrence,
[t]he opportunities for abuse are manifest. If a plaintiff wants to
avoid the arbitration panel (and she may have good reasons for do-
ing so ... ), then plaintiff need only sue a nonhealth care provider as
an original defendant, and allow him in turn to join the health care
provider. Collusion will not be necessary. The plaintiff can simply
serve a nonhealth care defendant with a complaint replete with alle-
gations of medical malpractice, and may be assured that the named
263. See, e.g., Armstrong County Memorial Hosp. v. Vitolo, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d
791 (Pa. C. 1979).
264. See, e.g., Bonk v. Block, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 749 (Pa. Admin. Arbitration
Panels for Health Care 1980) (cases dealing with Pennsylvania's mandatory pretrial
mediation system); Loverdi v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, No. M77-0383 (Pa.
Admin. Arbitration Panels for Health Care 1978).
265. See, e.g., Joyce v. Central Medical Health Serv., 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 666
(Pa. Admin. Arbitration Panels for Health Care 1978).
266. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4231 (West 1983) (sample arbitration agreement).
267. 398 A.2d 204 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
268. Id. at 207. See also Zielinski v. Zappala, 470 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Pa. 1979);
Walt Disney World v. Memorial Hosp., 363 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1978).
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defendant, seeking exculpation or contribution, will join the health
care provider as an additional defendant.2 6
Clearly, however, this situation will only arise when the defendant
nonprovider brings in the provider. If the plaintiff patient brings the
nonprovider in as a codefendant, this will not serve to avoid arbitration
of the patient-provider claim. Indeed, the court may sever the claims,
compelling arbitration on the action between the patient and the pro-
vider, while proceeding to litigation on the suit between the patient and
the nonprovider27
In the context of a voluntary arbitration agreement, the converse
situation, in which the patient submits a claim against a health care
provider to arbitration and the health care provider seeks to bring in
the nonprovider as an additional defendant, is less likely to occur. The
reason is obvious; if the patient voluntarily executed a postclaim arbi-
tration agreement with both the health care provider and the nonpro-
vider, she has contractually agreed to "joinder.'2'71 If, on the other
hand, the plaintiff had executed a pretreatment agreement with the
health care provider while agreeing also to arbitrate claims against
nonproviders, not only would the latter have to be identified in the
agreement, but they would also have to have executed a prior agree-
ment with the health care provider in order to be joined.27 2
Two medical malpractice arbitration statutes have derogated from
this consensual model. In Michigan, any existing party to the arbitra-
tion agreement may join any other party if that third party agrees to
joinder.' 3 Illinois permits joinder of third parties without their agree-
269. Staub, 398 A.2d at 209 (citation and footnote omitted).
270. Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1187-88 (Cal. 1976) (en
banc). See also Iser Elec. Co. v. Fossier Builders, 405 N.E.2d 439, 442 (I11. App. Ct.
1980) ("The general rule is that agreements to arbitrate will be enforced despite the
existence of claims by third parties or of pending multi-party litigation.").
271. Because the patient-third party agreement would not involve a medical mal-
practice claim, it would have to be made pursuant to, and be valid under, the jurisdic-
tion's general arbitration statute, thus begging the question. Only the Illinois medical
malpractice arbitration statute specifically provides for this scenario, stating:
Additional Parties. By consent of all parties to an arbitration proceeding, a
person, corporation, or entity not a signatory to the agreement may be in-
vited to participate in and be bound by the agreement, or may be accepted
into the agreement upon an offer to participate and be bound. If such invita-
tion or acceptance is made pursuant to consent of the arbitration parties, no
signatory may refuse to arbitrate because of the participation of such addi-
tional party. An additional participant shall execute a written statement to
be bound by the arbitration proceedings and agreement or shall sign the
agreement, and shall then be treated as a party.
Health Care Arbitration Act § 4, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 204 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1985).
272. Belobradich v. Sarnsethsiri, 346 N.W.2d 83 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
273.
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ment, but only if they are necessary parties.2 74 Furthermore, the Illi-
nois statute limits any such joinder to health care providers, hospitals
and their employees, or drug and equipment suppliers.t
This last qualification should serve to save the Illinois courts from
having to decide whether third parties who, for example, fall on278 or
throw snowballs at 2 "7 patients are "necessary" parties. Whether a
"health industry" party is a "necessary" party should depend upon
whether the claims made against the third party are so "inextricably
intertwined 27 8 as to preclude determination of the liability issue in
that primary claim.27 9 Thus, meritless claims or claims against concur-
rent tortfeasors would not warrant joinder.280 In contrast, a patient who
has submitted a claim under the Michigan statute and who wishes to
resist statutory consensual joinder2 81 would have to rely upon the more
general argument that "the legislature never intended the [arbitrators]
to pass upon questions other than that [sic] of medical malpractice." '282
A person who is not a party to the arbitration agreement may join in the
arbitration at the request of any party with all the rights and obligations of
the original parties. Each party to an arbitration under this chapter is
deemed to be bound by the joinder of a new party.
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5046(4) (West 1975).
274.
Necessary Parties. A hospital or health care provider, or an employee of a
hospital or health care provider, or a supplier, reasonably alleged to be a
joint tortfeasor in a cause of action subject to a health care arbitration
agreement shall be a necessary party to arbitration binding any of his joint
tortfeasors. On application of any party to the arbitration proceeding, the
circuit court may stay an arbitration proceeding commenced or threatened
on the grounds that a necessary party is not a signatory or party to the
agreement. That issue shall be forthwith and summarily tried and a stay
ordered if found for the moving party. If found for the opposing party, the
court shall order the parties to proceed to arbitration.
Health Care Arbitration Act § 5, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 205 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1985).
275. "'Supplier' means a person, corporation, partnership or other entity that
has manufactured, designed, distributed, sold, or otherwise provided any medication,
device, equipment, service, or other product used in the diagnosis or treatment of a
patient." Id. § 2(c), ILL. ANN. STAT. CH. 10, § 202(c).
276. Zielinski v. Zappala, 470 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
277. Gillette v. Redinger, 383 A.2d 1295 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
278. Conklin v. Montefiore Hosp. & Medical Center, 425 N.Y.S.2d 826, 831
(App. Div. 1980) (Lupiano, J., dissenting).
279. See, e.g., Smith v. Linn, 414 A.2d 1106, 1109 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980)
(joinder not necessary in such cases).
280. Conklin v. Montefiore Hosp. & Medical Center, 425 N.Y.S.2d 826, 830
(App. Div. 1980) (Lupiano, J., dissenting). See also Firich v. American Cystoscope
Makers, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 1043 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Morrison v. Therm-O-Rite Prods.
Corp., 468 F. Supp. 1295 (M.D. Pa.), affid, 612 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1979).
281. See supra note 273.




Statutory schemes permitting voluntary arbitration agreements be-
tween a health care provider and a "patient" 283 or "persons asserting a
claim"2 84 do not appear, on the surface, to present special problems
with the identification of persons contractually bound to submit their
claims to arbitration. At least three difficult questions arise, however.
First, as discussed earlier 2 85 a fact-intensive procedural conscionability
issue may be raised by a patient who relies upon a specific statutory
provision-for example, a provision that prohibits the offer of an arbi-
tration agreement to a patient undergoing emergency treatment,2 86 or
one that does not permit the enforcement of an agreement made with
an illiterate patient. 87 Second, a problem arises in cases in which the
patient did not execute the agreement in question; rather, it was exe-
cuted by a parent or legal representative. Third, there may be difficul-
ties when, although the patient executed the agreement, the claimant is
a stranger to the agreement. For example, this would occur when the
claim either involves the loss of consortium or is brought under a
wrongful death statute and is therefore asserted by a person who did
not personally execute the agreement.2 88 In answer to the second ques-
tion, the general rule is that a minor is not bound to submit his claims
to arbitration.2 18 A majority of malpractice arbitration statutes provide,
however, that a parent's execution of an arbitration agreement on be-
half of her minor child is binding upon the child. 29 The Illinois statute
283. ALASKA STAT. § 09-55-535(a) (1983).
284. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002 (Supp. 1985).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 200-02.
286. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5042(1) (West 1975). See also
Pipper v. DiMusto, 279 N.W.2d 542 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
287. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.24 (Baldwin 1984).
288. Consider also a fourth, albeit somewhat rare, scenario. A health care pro-
vider executes an arbitration agreement with a nonpatient claimant. The claimant tries
to avoid submission based on nonarbitrability as a matter of law. The health care pro-
vider replies that legal arbitrability exists because a state statute authorizes arbitration
of claims against health care providers. The claimant then seeks release from the obli-
gation to arbitrate based on the scope of the statute, as the statute only permits arbi-
tration agreements between patients and health care providers. The claimant prevails.
See, e.g., Thomasson v. Diethelm, 457 So. 2d 397 (Ala. 1984) (Alabama's Medical
Liability Act only contemplates actions brought by members of patient class).
289. See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Hayes, 12 So. 98, 103 (Ala. 1892).
See also Dickson v. Hoffman, 305 F. Supp. 1040 (D. Kan. 1969); Chernick v. Hartford
Accident Indem. Co., 187 N.Y.S.2d 534 (App. Div. 1959), affd, 168 N.E.2d 110
(N.Y. 1960); Britton v. William's Devisees, 20 Va. 453 (1819). See also Roberts v.
McNamara-Warren Community Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 279 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (ap-
parent approval of MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5046 (West 1975)).
290. See ALASKA STAT. § 09-55-535(d) (1983); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1295(d)
(West 1982) (codifying Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401 P.2d I (Cal. 1965)); Health Care Arbi-
tration Act § 7, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 207 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); LA. REV.
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goes so far as to permit a parent who herself is a minor to sign an
arbitration agreement that will bind her child! 91 Of course, the child
sought to be bound to submit to arbitration must have been included
within the scope of the agreement. In Weeks v. Crow,29 2 the plaintiff,
who was then pregnant, executed an arbitration agreement in which
she alone was described as the patient. Her child died shortly after
birth as a result of the alleged negligence of the defendants. In the
words of the court,
[t]he agreement contains no reference at all to the expected child;
only the expectant mother is named as the patient. If the parties had
intended to agree to arbitration of claims of negligence in treating
the child, they could easily have done so by also naming the ex-
pected child as a patient. The omission of any reference to the child
expresses an intention not to apply the agreement to malpractice
claims arising out of medical services rendered to the child.2 93
Thus, in Wilson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,2 94 a child claim-
ing for his prenatal injuries was forced to submit his claim to arbitra-
tion because his mother had executed a health care contract incorpo-
rating a malpractice arbitration agreement; the plan included by its
terms newborn members of the family.
Only the South Dakota statute expressly provides for arbitration
agreements to be executed on behalf of persons incapacitated other
than by minority.2 96 The absence of statutory authority, however,
would not necessarily preclude traditional agency principles from oper-
ating. It should be remembered that the fact-intensive litigation that
will result will not be supported by any contingent attorneys' fees sys-
tem296 and will make something of a mockery of the "speed and econ-
STAT. ANN. § 9.4231 (West 1983) (implicit from second signature line in nonmanda-
tory sample agreement); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5046(2) (West 1975); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-2 (1979); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.12 (1984) (implicit
from revocability provision).
291. Health Care Arbitration Act § 7, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 207 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1985).
292. 169 Cal. Rptr. 830 (Ct. App. 1980).
293. Id. at 832.
294. 190 Cal. Rptr. 649 (Ct. App. 1983).
295.
"Executors, administrators or personal representatives of an estate and a
legally appointed guardian for a ward shall have the authority ... to enter
into a binding arbitration agreement on behalf of the person, estate, benefi-
ciary, ward or heirs at law that they represent . ..."
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-2 (1979) (providing sample agreement).
This should not be confused with provisions permitting legal representatives to re-
voke such agreements. See, e.g., Health Care Arbitration Act § 9(c), ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 10, § 209(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.23(B)
(Baldwin 1984); VA. CODE. § 8.01-581.12.A (1984).
296. This is due to the high claim costs inherent in such cases, which will serve
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omy" virtues claimed for arbitration. The case of Blanton v. Woman-
care, Inc.'97 concerned a postclaim malpractice arbitration agreement
executed by an attorney purporting to act as his client's agent. In Blan-
ton, there was no question of either express actual authority or of
agency through ratification, for as the Supreme Court of California
noted, "the client did not consent to the agreement; she did nothing
beyond retention of the attorney to suggest that he had authority to
enter into such an agreement on her behalf; and she repudiated the
agreement as soon as she learned of it." 2' "1 Further, the court was of
the opinion that an attorney had neither "implied actual" nor "appar-
ent" authority to bind his client to arbitration:
When a client engages an attorney to litigate in a judicial forum, the
client has a right to be consulted, and his consent obtained, before
the dispute is shifted to another, and quite different, forum, particu-
larly where the transfer entails the sort of substantial consequences
present here. 99
Different problems arise when the claimant against whom submis-
sion to arbitration is sought to be compelled was a "stranger," that is,
neither the patient nor a signatory to the arbitration agreement. 00 The
general rule governing these cases was expressed by a California appel-
late court in Rhodes v. California Hospital Medical Center."' In this
case, the health care provider sought to compel the plaintiff's next of
kin to arbitrate claims for the wrongful death of a patient who had
executed an arbitration agreement. The court stated:
The right to arbitration depends on a contract. Neither Mr. Rhodes
nor the son have ever contracted to forego their rights to have their
cause of action determined by a jury in a normal judicial proceeding.
Although a wrongful death action must rest on a cause of action in
the decedent, we cannot hold that the decedent's agreement to arbi-
trate her possible cause of action is effective to bar the constitutional
and procedural rights of the decedent's heirs in their own, indepen-
dent action.302
to discourage attorneys from bringing marginal or low-yield suits. See supra note 6.
297. 696 P.2d 645 (Cal. 1985) (en banc).
298. Id. at 649.
299. Id. at 653.
300. The distinction between this and the type of case just discussed is addressed
in Weeks v. Crow, 169 Cal. Rptr. 830, 832 (Ct. App. 1980).
301. 143 Cal. Rptr. 59 (Ct. App. 1978).
302. Id. at 61 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). This begs the question
whether the wrongful death action in issue is one that creates an independent (depen-
dents') cause of action, or merely a derivative (survival type) claim. See Ballard v.
Southwest Detroit Hosp., 327 N.W.2d 370 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982), appeal in abeyance,
334 N.W.2d 375 (Mich. 1983) (presumably, the pending constitutional issue was re-
solved in Morris v. Metriyakool, 344 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. 1984)).
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Of course, if the decedent had been the agent s3 for the next of kin (for
example, the father or spouse) and had contracted with the health care
provider that the next-of-kin's causes of action would be arbitrated, the
opposite conclusion is supportable.30
In Herbert v. Superior Court,08 however, a California appellate
court apparently lost sight of the contractual, consensual nature of ar-
bitration. In that case, the appeals court compelled the arbitration of
wrongful death claims brought by adult children who had not been
made beneficiaries of the group health agreement executed by their fa-
ther, the decedent. The court said that it would be contrary to legisla-
tive intent to permit a single cause of action to be split between arbitra-
tion of the claims made by the spouse and minor children of the
decedent and litigation of the claims made by the adult children. The
court noted that "[i]t would be illogical to construe these statutory pro-
visions to apply only under the fortuitous circumstances that all poten-
tial heirs are also plan members." '  Why should a court consider it at
all "fortuitous" that one person should enter into a consensual agree-
ment when another does not? Such a characterization reveals the in-
herent difficulties the courts have faced in grappling with the issue of
who the proper claimants are in an- arbitration-infected malpractice
claim.
One might speculate that many of the recent problems encoun-
tered by the California courts have stemmed from what appears to be a
basic fallacy in the oft-cited decision in Madden v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals.807 The Supreme Court of California held in Madden that a
government employee was bound by a malpractice arbitration clause
inserted into a group health plan negotiated between a health care pro-
vider and the representatives of government employers.308 As a matter
of labor arbitration law, a nonparty to a collective bargaining agree-
ment may occasionally be bound by an arbitration clause in that agree-
303. See, e.g., Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976) (en
banc) (state organization was agent for state employee in negotiation of health plan
including arbitration clause). See also Dinong v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. Rptr. 606
(Ct. App. 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4231 (West 1983). Louisiana's sample
agreement provides that the patient agrees that claims by his heirs shall be submitted
to arbitration. Does this imply that the patient is his heirs' agent as a matter of law, or
must that be established on a case-by-case basis?
304. See Hawkins v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. Rtpr. 491, 494-95 (Ct. App.
1979) (wife required to arbitrate claim involving death of husband, pursuant to health
care contract entered into by husband).
305. 215 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1985).
306. Id. at 482.
307. 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
308. Note, however, that in Dinong v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. Rptr. 606, 610
(Ct. App. 1980), the court refused to interpret Madden and Wheeler v. St. Joseph's
Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1976), as requiring employee elected representatives to be
involved in the employer/group health provider negotiations.
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ment.3°9 The court in Madden, however, surely took an extra, unwar-
ranted step in holding that a nonparty could be bound by an arbitration
clause contained, not in the collective bargaining agreement, but in a
commercial contract between the "union" (the government employer
representative in Madden) and a supplier of services. Such a position
seems contrary to commercial arbitration law.3 10
D. Conduct of Health Care Providers
Instituting a scheme for the arbitration of medical malpractice
claims depends, of course, upon the determination of what constitutes a
medical malpractice claim. The Louisiana and Vermont legislative
draftsmen were apparently content to leave that issue open. 311 Some
draftsmen, however, have embellished that basic concept without ad-
ding anything of substance.31t Other legislative draftsmen have at-
tempted further to refine the components of medical malpractice
claims, but have succeeded in doing nothing more than adding ques-
tion-begging exclusions.313 Still others have attempted to narrow the
type of conduct susceptible to arbitration by referring to "professional
negligence, ' 311 or to negligent "care or treatment."3 15
309. See e.g., Pine Mfg. Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union,
383 N.E.2d 543 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
310. See, e.g., AI-hadad Bros. Enters. v. M.S. Agapi, 551 F. Supp. 956 (D. Del.
1982).
311. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4231 (West 1983) provides in its nonmandatory
specimen agreement that "[c]laims based on negligence or medical malpractice ...
shall be submitted to arbitration," while VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002(a) (Supp.
1985), covers any "claim based on medical malpractice."
312. ALA. CODE § 6-5-485(a) (1975) is phrased in terms of the rendering of, or
the failure to render, services by a health care provider. This provision is contained,
however, in the Alabama Medical Liability Act, which defines "Medical Liability" as
"[a] finding by a[n]... arbitration panel that a ... health care provider did not meet
the applicable standard of care." ALA. CODE § 6-5-481(9) (1975). See S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 21-25B-1 (1979) ("relating to services provided" implicitly restricts arbi-
trable services to matters within the competency of physician or hospital administrator
arbitrators).
313. See Health Care Arbitration Act § 2(d), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 202(d)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) ("'Health Care Arbitration Agreement' [includes] . . .a
claim for damages arising out of ... [injuries or death], due to hospital or health care
provider negligence or other wrongful act, but not including intentional torts.").
314. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1295(a) (West 1982) ("[a]rbitration of any
dispute as to professional negligence"); § 1295(g)(2) (" 'Professional negligence' means
a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of profes-
sional services."). See also MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5040(1) (West 1975)
("[i]njury ... caused by an error, omission, or negligence in the performance of profes-
sional services by a health care provider, hospital, or their agent, or based on a claimed
performance of such services without consent, in breach of warranty, or in violation of
contract"); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.1.5 (1984) ("'Malpractice' means any tort based on
health care or professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a
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The deterrence function of tort law and, a fortiori, intentional tort
law, will serve to cast doubts upon the survivability of an agreement
following judicial scrutiny of its arbitrability as a matter of law. The
courts, therefore, will be faced with a multitude of motions either to
stay or to compel arbitration to secure judicial rulings on the legality or
validity of the arbitration agreements.
Depending upon the statutory language, several difficult problems
arise. First, while a claim phrased in terms of breach of contract by the
health care provider would clearly be "a dispute arising out of care or
treatment," would it also be "professional negligence" or "medical
malpractice"? Such a claim, based as it is on the breach of an implied
warranty of reasonable professional diligence in the patient-health care
provider contract, has been characterized by some courts as merely du-
plicative of a tort claim.816 Further, there is authority to the effect that
"malpractice" includes these contractual counts. 17 The Michigan stat-
ute318 goes even further, if it is interpreted to include express warranty
claims 319 under its arbitration regime.
Even if the plaintiff's claim is phrased in terms of tort, it must be
recognized that not all torts are created equal. While informed consent
is clearly a "malpractice" or "professional negligence" tort, the same
cannot be said of a battery action based on lack of consent rather than
inadequate information.820 Thus, without specific statutory elucidation
health care provider, to a patient."); VA. CODE § 8.01-581.1.6 (1984) (" 'Health care'
means any act, or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been per-
formed or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient
during the patient's medical diagnosis, care, treatment or confinement.").
315. See ALASKA STAT. § 09-55-535(a) (1983) ("[a]ny dispute, controversy, or
issue arising out of care or treatment by the health care provider"); GA. CODE ANN. §
9-9-110 (1981) (" 'Medical malpractice claim' shall mean any claim for damages ...
arising out of: (1) Health, medical, dental or surgical service, diagnosis, prescription,
treatment, or care rendered by a licensed [health care provider], . . . or (2) Care or
service rendered by any [institutional health care provider]."); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2711.22 (Baldwin 1984) ("[any dispute or controversy arising out of the diagnosis,
treatment, or care rendered").
316. See, e.g., Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123 (Me. 1980).
317. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sisters of St. Mary v. Campbell, 511 S.W.2d 141
(Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
318. MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5040(1) (West 1975) ("in breach of war-
ranty, or in violation of contract").
319. See Brown v. Rabbit, 476 A.2d 1167 (Md. 1984) (express warranty claim
covered by Maryland's mandatory pretrial arbitration statute). See generally Note,
Express Contracts to Cure: The Nature of Contractual Malpractice, 50 IND. L.J. 361
(1975).
320. See Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 716-18 (N.D. Ill.
1978). See also Hodge v. Lafayette Gen. Hosp., 399 So. 2d 744 (La. Ct. App. 1981)
(interpreting Louisiana's compulsory pretrial review panel trigger of "unintentional
tort" as covering an informed consent allegation); Lubanes v. George, 435 N.E.2d 1031
(Mass. 1982) (claim based on informed consent subject to medical malpractice tribunal
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of whether such intentional tort claims are21 or are not322 arbitrable,
the issue will invite litigation.2 3
Similar problems arise when the plaintiff seeks to avoid submission
to arbitration by characterizing her claim in terms of strict liability,
such as products liability rather than negligence. It may be countered
that this should be of no concern since, even if such a claim is not
arbitrable, the health care provider will not be held strictly liable for
professional "negligence. '" 24 This ignores, however, that narrow range
of cases in which, for example, a hospital is in reality introducing a
product into the stream of commerce.2 5 Even if such a claim were to
be construed as a controversy arising out of care or treatment, 326 a
court should nevertheless conclude that, "[t]he expertise of the arbitra-
tion panel ...relates to medical liability, not products liability." 327
States that have defined the limits of malpractice arbitrability in
terms of "professional negligence, '"328 presumably exclude from submis-
sion claims dealing with "nonprofessional negligence," such as collaps-
ing equipment 329 or slips and falls. 330 Those premises liability cases,
however, are among the clearer cases for a court to deal with when a
plaintiff seeks to use an "ordinary negligence" standard. For a mal-
submission statute).
321. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5040(1) (West 1975).
322. See Health Care Arbitration Act § 2(d), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 202(d)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985).
323. See, e.g., Baker v. Sadick, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 681 (Ct. App. 1984) (lan-
guage of agreement about non-negligent claims to be considered in conjunction with
statutory terms); Nichols v. Wilson, 460 A.2d 57, 60-61 (Md. 1983) (battery claim not
covered by Maryland's mandatory arbitration scheme). Cf. Herrera v. Superior Court,
204 Cal. Rptr. 553, 557-58 (Ct. App. 1984) (patient's allegations of provider assault
and battery were subject to arbitration in lieu of grounds for revocation).
324. See, e.g., Hershley v. Brown, 655 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
325. See, e.g., Thomas v. St. Joseph Hosp., 618 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Ct. App.
1981). See generally Note, The Medical Profession and Strict Liability of Defective
Products-A Limited Extension, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 359 (1965).
326. See, e.g., Renz v. Ochsner Found. Hosp./Clinic, 420 So. 2d 1008, 1009 (La.
Ct. App. 1982).
327. Geisinger Medical Center v. Fisher, 413 A.2d 462, 464 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1980) (in context of medical care provider's petition for joinder of product manufac-
turer under Pennsylvania's mandatory arbitration scheme).
328. See supra note 314.
329. See, e.g., Cannon v. McKen, 459 A.2d 196 (Md. 1983). Cf. Walsh v.
LoPiccolo, 485 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (treatment-related claims still must be
placed before arbitration panel).
330. See, e.g., Head v. Erath Gen. Hosp., 458 So. 2d 579 (La. Ct. App. 1984);
Cashio v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 378 So. 2d 182, 185 (La. Ct. App. 1979). Cf.
Rothman v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 13 Pa. D. & C.3d 496 (Pa. C. 1979) (interpreting
broadly a claim resulting from the furnishing of health care services). See also Nemzin
v. Sinai Hosp., 372 N.W.2d 667 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (interpreting the Michigan
arbitration statute, which is phrased in terms of "dispute, controversy, or issue arising
out of health care or treatment," as including a fall from bed).
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practice arbitration statute to use "professional negligence" or even"medical malpractice" terminology invites exposure to the full range of
judicial sophistry associated with the conclusory medical-ministerial
characterization.33 1 Since the purpose of that characterization is to dis-
tinguish between cases that require expert testimony and those that do
not, a provision in the arbitration statute to the effect that expert testi-
mony is not always required3 2 has the effect of extending the arbitra-
tors' jurisdiction.
E. Punitive Damage Claims
State arbitration statutes are silent on the issue of recoverable
damages. This is no doubt due partially to the fact that those same
statutes seem to suggest that the determination of damage quantum
rests solely with the arbitrators. Submission of a case to arbitration
that involves a claim for punitive damages, however, raises several diffi-
331. See, e.g., Meier v. Ross Gen. Hosp., 445 P.2d 519 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
For cases decided in the context of mandatory pretrial arbitration or review, see Wyble
v. St. Luke Gen. Hosp., 415 So. 2d 622 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Herr v. St. Francis Hosp.,
9 Pa. D. & C.3d 610 (Pa. C. 1978).
In Hedlund v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1983), the Supreme Court of
California interpreted "professional negligence," as used in that state's Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act (which includes that state's malpractice arbitration provi-
sions), as not to be limited to the physician-patient relationship, but to include the
breach of a duty to warn a nonpatient. The implication is that "professional negli-
gence" will be interpreted as "negligence" by a (medical) "professional." Id. at 807-10.
For a recent example of the degree of judicial manipulation possible in such cases, see
Victoria v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985). An arbitration clause in a group
health plan applied by its terms to claims "arising out of service rendered (or not ren-
dered) pursuant to the Agreement." Noting that ambiguities in the agreement would
be interpreted against the health care provider, the majority of the Supreme Court of
California was of the opinion that
[pletitioner's claims involve neither financial disputes nor medical mal-
practice. Instead, she alleges a breach of the common law duty of an em-
ployer to exercise due care in the employment and supervision of an em-
ployee who inflicted intentional harm on her. . . . Furthermore, the
employee's alleged misconduct was entirely outside the scope of his employ-
ment. It had nothing to do with providing, or failing to provide, services. He
is not accused of negligently failing to empty a bedpan. He is accused of the
sexual assault and rape of petitioner.
Surely it was not contemplated, let alone expected, by either party to
the Agreement that this sort of attack would befall petitioner while she was
hospitalized under Kaiser's care. It is, therefore, difficult to conclude that
the parties intended and agreed that causes of action arising from such an
attack would be within the scope of the arbitration clause.
Id. at 7 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). For Judge Lucas, in dissent, the
majority's characterisation of the issue was transparent. "By improperly focusing only
on the employee's conduct, rather than on the actual claim against Kaiser, the majority
has strained to find ambiguity where none exists." Id. at 10 (Lucas, J., dissenting).




First, a claim for punitive damages usually is premised upon the
plaintiff's proving "that the defendant's conduct was willful or wanton,
in a reckless disregard of rights or interests." 34 Thus, the plaintiff's
claim in such a case is similar to a count expressed in intentional tort
law, a species of claim that not all malpractice arbitration statutes ex-
pressly include as arbitrable.3 35
Second, the deterrence function of a punitive award highlights dif-
ficult questions about the statutory scope of arbitrability. Since the
malpractice statutes omit express references to such claims, the courts
may well turn away from their general policy of favoring arbitration. If
a punitive damages claim changes the nature of the action from a
merely private dispute, it would cause serious practical difficulties. If
the compensatory claim had to be submitted to arbitration, but the pu-
nitive claim could be litigated, the proceedings would be duplicated
rather than streamlined-thus negating one of the ostensible purposes
of the arbitration agreement. 3
The argument that the strong public policy interest in the deter-
rent role of punitive damages should overcome private agreements on
their reallocation is analogous to the issue of the insurability of damage
claims.3 37 Although it is often asserted that the policy behind punitive
awards "would be frustrated if a tortfeasor were allowed to insure him-
self against an award of punitive damages," '838 many states nevertheless
do permit such contractual reallocation. The commonly supplied ration-
ale for deviation from the general rule is that "[t]he interests of doctors
and patients alike can best be served by medical malpractice insurance
that protects the doctor and patient, even when the doctor's negligence
is wanton or gross." 339 In these jurisdictions, therefore, the individual-
ized deterrence function of the punitive damage award is outweighed
333. See generally Note, Awarding Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice
Arbitration, 20 CAL. W.L. REV. 312 (1984). See also Bishop v. Holy Cross Hosp., 410
A.2d 630, 631-32 (Md. 1980) (plaintiff claiming punitive damages must exhaust con-
tracted-for arbitration device before invoking a court's jurisdiction); Note, Punitive
Damages in Arbitration: The Search for a Workable Rule, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 272
(1978).
334. Brown v. Maxey, 369 N.W.2d 677, 681 (Wis. 1985) (citation omitted).
335. See supra text accompanying notes 321-22. More specifically, consider
Nichols v. Wilson, 460 A.2d 57 (Md. 1983) (intentional tort claim for, inter alia, puni-
tive damages).
336. See, e.g., Herbert v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1985)
(submission to arbitration compelled to avoid splitting of cause of action in wrongful
death claim brought by both members and nonmembers of group health plan).
337. See Burrell & Young, Insurability of Punitive Damages, 62 MARQ. L. REV.
1 (1978).
338. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. McCabe, 556 F. Supp. 1342, 1356 (E.D. Pa.
1983).
339. Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 319 S.E.2d 217, 221 (N.C. 1984).
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by the more probable satisfaction of its "compensation" function upon
efficient reallocation through insurance spreading.
This rationale does not transfer readily to the arbitration arena.
Clearly, the deterrence goal of an award may be ignored by an arbitra-
tion panel less willing to characterize medical carelessness as "reck-
less." Further, the general deterrence 34 0 role of any punitive award may
be negated because the hearing and award will lack publicity. Yet in
the arbitration context, this diminution of the deterrence function will
be in addition to a less likely (or lesser) award of punitive damages and
not the quid pro quo for the guaranteed payment of a punitive dam-
ages judgment.
The only reported decision involving a punitive award following
voluntary arbitration of a medical malpractice claim resulted, ironi-
cally, from a health care provider's challenge of the award. In Baker v.
Sadick,341 a physician challenged a $300,000 punitive award in a case
that had been submitted to arbitration on both negligence and inten-
tional tort grounds. In upholding the award against the physician, the
California appellate court paid scant attention to the physician's argu-
ment that arbitration was an inappropriate source for the award of a
penalty. This case, however, does not establish that a patient cannot
resist submission of a claim seeking punitive damages to arbitration.
First, the clear implication of the physician's argument in Baker was
that the arbitrators had exclusive jurisdiction over this type of medical
malpractice claim. The argument was not phrased in terms of dealing
with the compensatory claims in arbitration, but rather with the puni-
tive claims in litigation. The physician was attempting to have his cake
and eat it too." 2 Second, in interpreting the agreement, the court did
not take the standard contra proferenten approach that ambiguities
would, in this case, be resolved against the patient. Instead, the court
labelled the agreement a contract of adhesion, then focused on the une-
qual bargaining position of the parties and resolved the ambiguities in
340. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 121, at 68-94. See also Calabresi, Optimal
Deterrence and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656 (1975); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a
Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
341. 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (Ct. App. 1984).
342. Or, more precisely:
[The physician] also claims the public policy favoring arbitration will be
frustrated if arbitrators are permitted to award punitive damages. [The phy-
sician] asserts punitive damages are a form of penalty reserved for imposi-
tion by the state. Therefore, he argues, contracts which provide for private
penalties are unenforceable. It is further urged punitive damages awards
made in civil actions are subject to judicial review and since arbitration
awards including punitive damages are not reviewable, agreements to arbi-




favor of the patient.3 4 3 And of course, in this case, the patient had no
quarrel with the wide scope attributed to the agreement by the arbitra-
tors.344 Third, the court suggested that a patient's motion to stay arbi-
tration would be treated more favorably in this context than a physi-
cian's challenge to a jointly submitted award. 43
X. CONCLUSION
In summary, state legislatures that have facilitated the arbitration
of medical malpractice claims have thrust a multitude of new and diffi-
cult legal issues onto their courts' overcrowded dockets. Are such statu-
tory provisions constitutional? What degree of judicial control over the
bargaining process will suffice to ensure that any arbitration is volun-
tary? Which of the many different species of litigation concerning med-
ically related injuries will be subject to arbitration? At the very least,
the opponents of "speedy and economical" medical malpractice arbitra-
tion will have the satisfaction of knowing that the legal problems inher-
ent in existing state facilitated and encouraged systems will guarantee
complex and expensive litigation for years to come. Such problems
could have been avoided if the philosophy of alternate dispute resolu-
tion and the traditions of arbitration had not been ignored by legisla-
tures apparently willing to do anything to satisfy the complaints of the
health care and insurance industries. In the first place, alternate dis-
pute resolution systems are just that-alternatives, not blanket substi-
tutes. In the second place, the historically voluntary nature of arbitra-
343. Compare the Sadick court's appeal with CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1295(e)
(West 1982) (providing that a contract which includes an arbitration clause "is not a
contract of adhesion" when statutory requirements are met).
344. Specifically, the court found that
[firom the face of the statute and the agreement, it appears: Neither the
statute nor the agreement specifically mention or authorize [sic] a claim for
punitive damages. In fact, the definition of "professional negligence" ap-
pears to limit the recovery to a "negligent act or omission." This latter lan-
guage . . . creates an uncertainty, an ambiguity. Here, it is not the weaker
party, [the patient], who seeks to limit the arbitration settlement. Rather, it
is [the physician] who seeks to escape the broad embrace of the general
terms of the arbitration agreement. In this context we construe the language
favorable to [the patient]'s (the nondrafter's) position.
208 Cal. Rtpr. at 681.
345.
This is not a case where the doctor alone insists upon submitting the pa-
tient's claim for punitive damages to arbitration. Whether such request is
supported by the ambiguous language of this agreement is not before us. In
this case it is the patient as well as the doctor who have submitted this
intentional wrong, fraud, punitive damages claim to the arbitrators. Having
consented to this submission, the doctor may not now assert a lack of au-
thority in the arbitrators to award punitive damages.
19861
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL
tion is deserving of respect. Any state legislature contemplating the
introduction of malpractice arbitration should consider restricting it to
postclaim agreements so that the voluntary nature of arbitration will
not be destroyed by health care providers with their pretreatment stan-
dard form contracts. Given time, such arbitration could win the accept-
ance and participation of the bar and the medical profession. Further-
more, any such facilitating legislation should target situations in which
the traditional virtues of arbitration such as speed and economy would
bring real advantages. By way of example, consider the benefits that
would accrue to elderly nursing home residents if their claims against
their institutions could be resolved by arbitrators.
Yet whatever the philosophical, distributional, and technical
problems with the current brand of malpractice arbitration, its time
may well have arrived. It seems unlikely that the courts will stand in its
way." Judges know that they, too, are not immune from blame for the
existence of a malpractice crisis. As the late Judge Tobriner, once a
champion of expanded provider liability, 47 stated,
[u]nder the aegis of permissive legislation and favorable judicial de-
cisions, arbitration has become a proper and usual means of resolv-
ing civil disputes, including disputes relating to medical malpractice.
We should not now turn the judicial clock backwards to an era of
hostility toward arbitration. We should not fetter that institution
with artificial requirements .... We should not impose debilitating
obstructions, such as those urged by plaintiffs, which could very well
jeopardize the legality of the huge number of presently functioning
and efficacious arbitration agreements.3 48
In permitting the arbitration of medical malpractice claims, how-
ever, the courts will in effect be consigning malpractice law and the
standards expected of the medical profession to a time capsule. Arbi-
trators will not entertain novel claims. Health care providers will
change their ways, if at all, only because of dubious market and mar-
keting considerations. The successors of Judge Learned Hand may still
346. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 997 ("[T]he courts are not really free to
engage in distrust of the arbitration process at this point in time and history."). See
also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (contracts to arbitrate may not be
avoided by allowing one of the parties to ignore the agreement and resort to the
courts).
347. See, e.g., Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 738-42 (Cal.
1980) (en banc) (Tobriner, J., dissenting); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551
P.2d 334, 339 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (Tobriner, J., writing for the majority); Clark v.
Gibbons, 426 P.2d 525, 535-40 (Cal. 1967) (en banc) (Tobriner, J., concurring).
348. Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 131 Cal. Rptr. 882, 892 (1976) (en
banc). Cf. Davis v. Blue Cross, 600 P.2d 1060, 1063-64 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) (insurer




assert that "[c]ourts must in the end say what is required,"'a4" but they
will be bereft of the jurisdiction to give effect to that principle. Courts
that once successfully demolished the "Balkanization"35 of the medical
profession will have abetted its enthusiastic embrace of stasis.
349. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
350. See Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. 1968).
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